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Abstract 
Projected Comrades:  
A Comparative Study of Ideologies in Cultural Revolution and May ’68 Cinema 
 
Siyuan Ren, BPhil 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
 
 
 
This thesis compares the ideologies in Chinese films made during the Cultural Revolution and 
French films contemporaneously influenced by the May ’68 milieu. By examining the content and 
methods of the political messages delivered in ten selected cinematic texts, the study finds that the 
Chinese films display a tendency to convey more political, more exclusive (to specific real-life 
political figures and entities), and more consistent messages, with a grander narrative, while the 
French counterparts tend to be more universal (rather than limited to specific, real-life political 
figures or entities), inconsistent, and self-reflective. All the texts share discontents with the 
portrayed status quo to different extents, but with one notable difference: the Chinese films provide 
the answer, whereas the French films often end in impasse, without proposing any viable solution 
at all. 
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Preface 
It was Godard’s brilliantly eccentric La Chinoise that brought the French side of the 1968 
zeitgeist to my attention, and subsequently inspired this wildly interdisciplinary study of cinema, 
politics, and philosophy — a confluence of my personal interests as well. The ostensible 
ideological resonance between Chinese films made during the Cultural Revolution and French 
ones contemporaneously inspired by the social conditions of May ’68 seemed uncanny and made 
me wonder to what extent their shared vocabulary means the same in their respective contexts. 
This study answers the question, but more importantly, during the attempt of answering it, explores 
the various types and mechanisms of political messaging at work.  
One difficulty of my cross-disciplinary approach is that it becomes ambiguous to which 
discipline’s criterion should the research subscribe. In tackling this crucial problem, I am indebted 
to my thesis advisor, Dr. Iza Ding, whose meticulous feedback is indispensable for this amorphous 
thesis to have any rigor, clarity, or coherence at all. The study would also not be possible without 
inspirations from the political theory course “Myth, Propaganda, and the State,” during which Dr. 
Andrew Lotz took issue with the naïve understanding of propaganda and urged the class to think 
philosophically on this concept that became an underlying theme of this thesis. I am grateful for 
his teaching and generous help during and after the class. Finally, I would like to thank my parents 
for their financial support without which I might not be able to have completed this research during 
summer breaks. 
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1.0 Introduction and Overview 
 
When the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was asked in the early 1970s to comment on the French 
Revolution, he said, “It’s too soon to tell.” This statement has now become, in the West, a cliché 
of profound oriental wisdom: the impact of one event cannot be determined in “only” about two 
centuries; the dust that a revolution blows can take, perhaps, millennia to truly settle.  
It could be such a wiseman anecdote if only he were talking about the 1789 revolution. But 
he was not, and the “revolution” in this question, in fact, refers to what in retrospect was anything 
but a full-fledged one. That event is nowadays known as the May '68 Movement, or in French, 
simply “mai 68,” a period of volatile civil unrest in the late 60s France.1 
It does, however, serve as a proof of this senior communist revolutionary’s fervent care for 
France, a place where he was exposed to communist theories as a student, and (some) French 
people’s fight for fundamental social change. Although he died way too soon to see a successful 
revolution in France, Zhou himself did spend his last days in a “revolution” that he, and probably 
all Chinese people at that time, had complicated, personal feelings about: The Cultural Revolution. 
“The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” has been, since not long after its end, officially 
declared as a “costly mistake” that caused “the most severe setback and the heaviest losses” by the 
Chinese Communist Party. What may seem to be an uncanny phenomenon to young generations 
today, whether in the “West” or “East,” is that at the time, carrying Mao’s portrait in street protests 
and citing quotes from the Little Red Book, did emerge among many unlikely places around the 
 
1 History Today, “Zhou Enlai's Famous Saying Debunked.” 
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world. Even some citizens within the “capitalist bloc” such the U.S., Japan, British Hong Kong, 
Italy, West Germany, and France displayed, depending on one’s predisposition, either a collective 
madness or a tragic resistance in response to the status quo. The only safe assertion about that 
volatile period is its complexity. 
A number of films made at that time reflect this trend. In France, it was the time when the 
New Wave had just ended with its final glamor, and for some auteurs, even this avant-garde 
movement no longer seemed radical and revolutionary enough. Meanwhile, in China, the state-
owned film industry virtually broke down because of the political and economic turmoil. But still, 
a handful of films were made to express the official revolutionary ideology of the period. In this 
regard, the conversation of the two “revolutions” in France and China did not just happen on each 
country’s streets, but on screens, too. In some cases, there is even obvious intertextuality in some 
of the films, most obviously in the French ones where the Maoist China is referred to as the 
inevitable “other” in different senses, making them valuable to the understanding of China’s 
ideology through a different perspective. Despite the lack of direct reference of France, the Chinese 
films made from 1966 to 1976 also provide crucial texts of the ideological orientation that are 
worthy of close readings and comparative studies without which the analysis of the aforementioned 
French counterparts would be incomplete.   
In this thesis, I compare the Chinese films made during the Cultural Revolution and their 
French counterparts contemporaneously inspired by the social conditions of May 68. I ask one key 
question: how much commonality – if at all – is there between the two movements situated in 
drastically different socioeconomic conditions as reflected in these films? This calls for an inquiry 
of the content and types of the political messages in the films, as well as the way in which they are 
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delivered in the medium of cinema. It requires the identification of potential patterns in each group 
of the films as well as a comparison between the potential patterns. 
My selection of the films is based on various factors. For the Chinese films, I select films 
that are made during the Cultural Revolution since the movement is a distinctive and long period 
whose “official ideology” is hardly the same throughout its development. Among the candidates, 
I prioritize household names as they represent the most influential version of the official ideology. 
But I also balance the genres, directors, and years so that they would be less homogeneous and 
unrepresentative. The French films are not selected strictly based on the time period of May ’68. 
The reason is, unlike the Cultural Revolution, this movement per se is much shorter, making it 
unfeasible to select only that month or so. It would also not be desirable, since to limit our scope 
this way is to miss the potential influence of the movement over time. This is especially true as the 
movement whose social conditions preceded the most intense period and persisted after that one 
month and that one year. Also, the film production takes longer time than texts such as media 
reports, which warrants a more liberal selection of the films. Nevertheless, the stretch should not 
be excessive to the extent that it goes beyond the Cultural Revolution’s period. Otherwise, the 
validity of our analysis would be undermined. The diversity and representativeness in terms of 
genres, directors are still important factors in my choice. For our purposes, films that do not make 
any reference to the social conditions of May ’68 are not considered in my selection. 
Of course, the selection of those films is still limited in number and inevitably not a 
perfectly representative picture of all the films. But I believe that the analysis partially reflects the 
situation and is still worth a close examination for our purposes.  
To organize the comparison and better present the arguments on the drastically different 
groups of works (dominantly differentiated not by genre, nor chronological order, but nationality), 
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the main body of the thesis is separated into the following parts: First, a basic analysis of the nature 
as well as the basic features of ideology and their presence in fictional texts. This will serve as the 
groundwork for the following analysis of the texts. Second, an analysis of five Cultural Revolution 
films, beginning with an introduction of their cinematic and political contexts and ending with my 
conclusion of the shared characteristics of those films. For each film, a context analysis is provided, 
before a synopsis and the analysis of ideology. Third, an analysis of five films made during 1966 
to 1976 with clear reference to or notable inspiration from the social conditions of May ’68. The 
structure of this part is the same as that of the second part. In the end, the study summarizes that, 
while generally sharing a common negative sentiment with capitalism, the films made during the 
Cultural Revolution, compared with their French counterparts of the May ’68, deliver political 
messages that are more consistent rather than inconsistent, exclusive rather than universal. The 
French films are by comparison more self-reflective and, more often than not, do not point to a 
solution to the depicted problems and discontents. 
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2.0 A Theoretical Framework of Ideologies in Fictional Texts 
To critically analyze the films’ embedded ideologies, it is helpful to set up a framework 
under which the characteristics of the ideology in various texts can be discerned and made sense 
of. To compare these films with methodological consistency, it is also reasonable to make sure 
that all films in this study will be held to the same set of criteria. For these purposes, the meaning 
and usage of many terms ought to be clarified beforehand.  
Many concepts involved in this study can be disputed. In fact, most, if not all of them, have 
indeed been disputed extensively. For instance, the term “ideology” is sometimes used to describe 
a belief system that promotes special interest but is presented as rational universal truth. 
Understood as such, it is contrasted by an ideally rational discourse. Some, however, argue that 
the two concepts are better understood as supplementing each other, rather than in strict opposition. 
Ideology, according to Purvis and Hunt’s theory, is the conceptualization of power relations 
(domination/subordination) as maintained by social practice, while discourse emphasizes the use 
of language, which is a unique form of practice with implications on power relations.2 Much can 
also be said — and have indeed been said — about the boundary of the political. A clear conceptual 
distinction between the economic (or the cultural, the social) and the political has been challenged 
no later than Marx. Thanks to social philosophers, some the second-wave feminists in particular, 
nor could “the personal” escape an expansive understanding of the political.3 
 
2 Purvis, Trevor, and Alan Hunt, “Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology,” 496-498. 
3 Hanisch, Carol, “The Personal Is Political,” 113-116. 
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Instead of committing myself to any specific position in those conceptual disputes and risk 
undermining the legitimacy of the whole research that relies on a particular set of theory, I set out 
to do something more modest.4 Here I do not aim to define the concepts definitively. I instead 
simply stipulate and clarify the sense in which I will use them. Those concepts can be understood 
to have different types, which I take to be very much a priori, and form categories in classification 
of specific cases.5 These categories constitute the framework of this study. We begin with the term 
“(political) message.” 
A “political6 message” that I refer to is an expressed political proposition — a statement 
that could be of the “descriptive” (what is the “objective” case without no value judgment broadly 
 
4 Or at least more intellectually honest. After all, any thesis that relies on what the author insists to be the 
correct understanding of the concepts may as well be said to predicate her thesis upon those suppositions.  
5 They are a priori at least in the sense that they conform to the basic logical rules. For example, a proposition 
can be either about dogs or not — this is a priori. Of course, the additions such as the “nuance” between types are 
results of further reflections among specific cases, and the choice to include certain typology (such as 
consistency/inconsistency, exclusivity/universality) and exclusion of others (like whether it is about dogs or not) is 
based on my perceived relevance for my purposes. This inevitable subjectivity in my choice defines and confines the 
analytic scope of this study, but hopefully not of much impact on the neutrality within that scope. 
6 Here “political” is merely “related to politics.” It could be descriptive or normative. There is certainly 
nuance. A normative statement about a type of food, for example, may or may not have political implications, 
depending whether it is associated with, for example, a certain culture or class — which could involve sentiments 
towards a group of people in a certain context. Another example: When one complains about the weather in Pittsburgh, 
the sentiment, depending on context, could be extended to imply sentiments on the people, the culture, etc., and 
becomes political.  
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construed) type or the “normative” (judging value, including “right” or “wrong,” “beautiful” or 
“ugly,” “desirable” vis-à-vis “undesirable,” and “pleasant” vis-à-vis “unpleasant”) type.   
A proposition that is “ideological,” in the sense that this study adopts, is a normative 
political proposition (“sentiments” that may or may not be expressed) from which a potentially 
infinite set of other self-claimed consistent and even self-claimed “sound” (in the logical sense of 
the term) normative political propositions are theoretically derived. For example, 
environmentalism essentially considers the environmental wellbeing valuable, and the advocacy 
for policies and regulations against industrial pollution is derived from that value judgment. 
According to the believers of this ideology, this set of normative propositions may probably be 
held universally to all, or “sound.” 
Therefore, under this framework, a purely descriptive message (supposing that it is 
possible), even when related to politics, is not ideological. “The current U.S. President is Donald 
Trump” as a political message in a context where no value judgment is evoked has no ideological 
worth. Only a normative message can be ideological. There is, of course, nuance. For instance, the 
Big Bang theory — perhaps not even a political message in many contexts— in the society where 
religious people have attached the explanations of the origin of the universe with a value judgment 
(that is, a religion simultaneously promotes messages like “God creates the universe” and “one 
should love the creator”) does make the otherwise non-ideological message have an aspect of 
normative statement thus making the message relatively ideological in the particular context.7 
 
7 For our purposes, the messages are read in the text’s original context to determine whether they involve 
value judgment, and if so, what kind of value judgment.   
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Ideological messages can be further divided into two types with nuance in between: 
messages that are exclusive, and messages that are universal. “Exclusive” refers to the property of 
a message that regiment a sentiment towards an individual, a group of people, a specific entity, a 
particular policy, or an action. For instance, in an election where candidate X and Y are essentially 
the same in all aspects, an advisement of X’s campaign propagandizing that “X is the right choice 
because X kindly donates to charity”) is an exclusive message given that the universalization of 
its logic to its peer Y, who also donates to charity, would not be consistent with its point. It is 
different from universal ideological messages in that for the latter, if and when different parties 
promote the same universal message, there would not be inconsistency for this message. For 
example, communism is rather universal because it claims to be a solution for the whole humanity, 
while Chinese nationalism is more exclusive, because, were there a hypothetical peer of the 
Chinese nation, whose other aspects are similar to that of the Chinese nation, the promotors of 
Chinese nationalism would still, in contrary to logical consistency, not advocate for the other 
nationalism (although they would likely deny the similarity to avoid the double standard, unless 
they do not seek the pretense of “objectivity” at all). Normative statements can also be phrased in 
a descriptive form since the believers, as said, may deem them universal, or “sound.” Statements 
like “bearing arms is a God-given right,” “one should not lie,” “it’s immoral to kill,” and “everyone 
has the natural right to life and liberty” merely express sentiments instead of truly attempting to 
describe what is the case, unless they are truly enforced, in which case they become demands, 
promises, or warnings, like “if one lies, one would face punishment” or, “right to life and liberty 
is our constitution’s promise to our citizens.”  
Each ideological (i.e. political and normative) message consists of positive or negative 
sentiments. A (set of) ideological message(s) may have mixed sentiments towards a target, which 
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makes the set inconsistent. The more inconsistent a (set of) ideological message(s) is, the 
ideologically weaker it becomes. 
The two dimensions of an ideology — exclusivity-universality and consistency-
inconsistency — will be measured in this study. Table 1 outlines the various according types, 
together with non-ideological political messages.  
Table 1. Categories of Political Messages 
 
8 This “inconsistency” is not necessarily a logical inconsistency. It is inconsistent in the sense that the 
sentiment it evokes is a mixed one. 
 
Ideologically 
Strong Political 
Messages 
(Normative, 
presented in 
consistency) 
Ideologically 
Weak Political 
Messages 
(Normative; 
presented in 
inconsistency8) 
Nuance 
(Descriptive 
attached with 
normativity; 
consistent or 
not; sound or 
not) 
Non-Ideological 
Political 
Messages 
(Descriptive, 
consistent or 
not; sound or 
not) 
Exclusive 
Messages (on 
persons, 
entities, 
policies, 
actions, ideas) 
E.g., “Trump is the 
best president in 
the history;” “The 
GOP is the enemy 
of the people;” 
“The UK should 
leave the EU;” 
“America is 
inherently 
exceptional.” 
E.g., “President 
Trump did good 
things and bad 
things;” “The 
GOP is as good as 
it is evil;”  
E.g., “The 
crowd in 
Trump’s 
inauguration 
ceremony was 
the biggest 
ever.” 
E.g., “President 
Trump was born 
in New York;” 
“The GOP is the 
ruling party.” 
Nuance 
(between 
exclusive and 
universal) 
E.g., “All 
Communist Parties 
in the world are 
great.” 
E.g., “Immigrants 
are good and bad 
to a developing 
country.”  
E.g., “The 
employment rate 
in developed 
countries tends 
to be higher 
when the ruling 
party is left-
wing.”  
E.g., “The 
reports of neo-
Nazi activities 
in the world 
have seen a rise 
in the past five 
years.” 
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Ideological messages in fictions are usually not given in plain slogans as seen in many 
street-level propaganda posters; they are delivered by various often inconspicuous techniques. 
Nevertheless, they are in nature not unlike less sophisticated propaganda slogans in that they all 
fundamentally rely on associations — linking the intended target in a message with an emotion 
evoker.  For an author of a fictional text, to deliver an ideological message is to direct audiences 
to experience an emotion (mostly either positive — pleasure, or negative — displeasure) and 
attribute this emotion to a target (persons, entities, ideas). It is conditioning in its broader sense, 
but the path can be more convoluted.  
There are emotion evokers that are primal, based on psychological conditions and 
sociohistorical construction, one usually considers being caring, sympathetic, altruistic as 
desirable, “moral” qualities, and the image of hurting evokes pain. Besides these primal ones, 
societies (specifics vary) may also attach positive emotions to concepts such as “patriotism,” 
“freedom,” “tradition,” “communism,” “loyal,” “revolutionary.” When these qualities are attached 
to targets like a person, an entity, an action, a policy, or an idea, an ideological message that 
promotes positive sentiment towards such a target is constructed. For instance, in the context where 
environmentalism is a positive emotion evoker, a company can brand itself as environmental-
friendly and harvest positive sentiment in such an association. 
Universal 
Messages (on 
policies, 
actions, ideas) 
E.g., “Every nation 
should adopt an 
isolationist policy;” 
“We humanity 
should abolish 
private property;” 
“Communism is 
evil.”  
E.g., 
“Communism 
may be heaven for 
some people and 
hell for others.” 
 
E.g., 
“Capitalism and 
democracy are 
statistically 
relevant.” 
E.g., 
“Communism is 
a political 
ideology.” 
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In a context where a target already has a well-established association with positive emotion 
evokers, the target could in turn become a positive emotion evoker itself, like a newly magnetized 
object that can magnetize others. For example, if Chairman Mao has been well established to be 
“caring,” “patriotic,” “revolutionary,” a Communist soldier depicted reading Mao’s work in a 
devout way is likely to be a character that has many respected qualities as well, and his property 
of being a Communist would attach positive emotions to the Communist Party. 
In creative expressions, emotion evoker could be more inconspicuous. The image, for 
example, could be presented in a distorted manner, with effects, filters, etc. The camera would take 
a certain angle and move in a manipulative way. The distance from camera to characters or other 
objects makes a difference. The background music and other sound effects can render very subtle 
emotions. The objects that seemingly appear arbitrarily are likely to be a deliberate design with 
intended semiotic associations. The time and order of images may be edited to serve a particular 
purpose. The lighting evokes various emotions as well.  
In some occasions, the ideology can be conveyed without the presence of the target (hook) 
in the text. Instead, it can be in meta-text such as the authorship. A state-sponsored film in which 
there is no reference of the regime can still link the regime to the emotion evokers (some “morals,” 
or “values” in a cartoon story, for instance) in the text. The negative messages work in a similar 
way. The only difference is that, of course, the association would adopt negative emotion evokers. 
One problem in the analysis is the potential mismatches between the authors’ intentions, 
the texts per se, and the viewers’ subjective reading of the text. This study is not unconcerned with 
authors’ intentions, but any pursuit of which, especially when relying on authors’ own comments, 
risk undermining the exact effort. Therefore, the analysis would for the most part draw inferences 
from the texts per se, as the goal is to identify what ideology could be conveyed to the audience 
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through the text, with only considerations of necessary cinematic and political context. I will try 
to refrain from making normative statement in the analysis. The epistemological limitations, 
however, would be inevitable.  
Do such stipulations — even though I do not wish to defend (i.e. argue and provide reasons 
in the theoretical disputes) them — inevitably commit me, at least in this particular study, to some 
stances on the subject matter of “the political,” “the ideology,” or “the discourse?” I do not resist 
this judgment as long as it does not constitute a theoretical critique of the stipulations. I do fully 
acknowledge that those who understand ideology in a way different from the sense of the word 
used in this study may be disappointed. I only hope that those stipulations are justified for my 
purposes: I do not wish to conduct a thorough analysis of a film that is not explicitly political, such 
as Truffaut’s Stolen Kisses (1968), not because I reject that it is political. I only do so for the sake 
of the feasibility of this study — I would not be able to select all the films, or some of the film 
over another if I do not prioritize the explicitly political ones. I take full responsibility if this 
prioritization results in limitations or bias in my selection and analyses of the films. Still, it should 
be noted that in my analyses I do go beyond what is explicitly political, and the interpretation of 
the dialog in The Mother and the Whore is one salient example.  
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3.0 Chinese Cinema in Cultural Revolution 
3.1 Overview of the Political and Cinematic Context 
After the Great Leap Forward, whose devastating failure was largely attributed to Mao, 
and China’s split with the Soviet Union, as an escalation of ideological (and geopolitical) dispute 
over Khrushchev’s secret report that denounced aspects of Stalinism, Mao, likely perceiving his 
own status threatened, began to emphasize the importance of a new round of political purge. With 
the precursor of his criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, a play that he considered an 
insinuation of his dismissal of Peng Dehuai, the then Minister of National Defense and an open 
critic of Mao’s Great Leap Forward policy, Mao started to give direct guidelines of Cultural 
Revolution with the “May 16 Notification,” in which he declared that “it is necessary […] to 
criticize and repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, 
the government, the army, and all spheres of culture, to clear them out or transfer some of them to 
other positions.”9 In this Politburo conference where the Notification was issued, Mao also selected 
his own Cultural Revolution Group, replacing Peng Zhen’s “Five Man Group” that defended the 
play’s intention. Mao denounced this group’s account (known as the February Outline) a sign of 
Peng Zhen’s revisionism.10 The period from this to the Communist Party’s 9th National Congress 
in 1969 was the first phase in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were purged and Mao 
 
9 Marxists Internet Archive, “Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” 
10 Roderick MacFarquhar, Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution. 
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appointed Lin Biao as heir presumptive. The second phase, in which Lin remained second-in-
command, ended with the failure of his alleged coup in 1973. From the Party’s 10th National 
Congress (1973) to 1976 when the Cultural Revolution ended, the Gang of Four effectively held 
power.11 
The logic of Cultural Revolution may seem contradictory: The mobilized masses were 
authorized and encouraged by the de facto head of regime to purge the major components of 
regime, except for that head per se and his trusted ones — be that Lin Biao or Gang of Four. But 
it would be consistent if we summarize the ideology as “Maoism” not in the sense of a universal 
ideology, but a strict obedience of the authority of Mao only — together with, at best, its extension 
to his trustees. Also, only in this manner can we make sense of the lack of a genuine left-right 
(progressive-conservative) dispute in all the causes of the revolution. However, for what could 
only be understood as optic reasons, disloyalty was not the charge Mao would openly accuse his 
perceived opponents of. Radical attacks on anything associated with “the past” — from 
Confucianism to “bourgeois” tendency, or other discontents towards bureaucracy — would serve 
a logical excuse to give the persecution a facade of progressive politics — one that the masses 
could be and indeed were mobilized around as enthusiastic participants. 
Cultural Revolution was not the first time that Mao emphasized on ideological control of 
art and cultural affairs. In Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art (May 1942), Mao had already 
pointed out that, “[t]here is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes, 
art that is detached from or independent of politics. Proletarian literature and art are part of the 
whole proletarian revolutionary cause; they are, as Lenin said, cogs and wheels in the whole 
 
11 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Cultural Revolution.” 
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revolutionary machine.”12 This essentially explains his sensitivity to arts, which may contain 
adversarial political messages, and summarizes his policy on art-making — to deliver political 
messages in accordance with his regime’s ideology.  
Given that Cultural Revolution is about the authority of Mao (and the opposition of any 
opposition of such authority), the radical left facade (anti-conservative of any kind, and in favor 
of efforts towards a communist ideal) and that all forms of art should convey revolutionary 
messages, it seem to follow that the films ought to be highly consistent and exclusive propaganda. 
The analysis does not contradict this conclusion, but how this is executed is not as simplistic. 
3.2 The Legend of the Red Lantern (“红灯记,” 1970) 
Context 
With most works previously made forbidden for screening and new ones hardly produced, 
available films were scarce in the Cultural Revolution, especially in its early stage. Adapted from 
one of the eight original “model plays,” The Legend of the Red Lantern (1970), a “collective 
creation” by the China Peking Opera Troupe and August First Film Studio, became one of the first 
films that get to be made. As a filmed stage performance, the film calls into question its 
qualification of being a genuine cinematic piece. Although in a technical sense, simply being 
recorded on such a medium suffices the threshold of a “film” in its broad denotation, the doubt 
does have its merits in terms of cinematic specificity and genre conventions. It is noteworthy that 
 
12 Zedong Mao, “Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art.” 
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such practice has a long tradition in China’s cinematic history. In fact, the first Chinese-made film 
is usually considered to be The Battle of Dingjunshan (1905), a recorded performance of Peking 
Opera. As a “modern revolutionary Peking opera,” The Legend of the Red Lantern adopts this 
traditional theatrical form, with elements such as costumes, scores, stage settings, and character 
archetypes “reformed.” The theme, being “revolutionary,” entails a hyper-political nature.  
 
Plot 
Set in Japanese-occupied territory of China during the World War II, the film features a 
revolutionary family of three: The father Li Yuhe (Hao Liang), the daughter Tiemei (Liu 
Changyu), and Grandma Li (Gao Yuqian). The three characters, all of whom communists or 
sympathizers of the Communist Party, live under one roof, but are in no way related by blood, 
only sharing class solidarity and a commitment to the revolutionary cause. Li Yuhe works as a 
signal lamp (“the Red Lantern”) operator, but secretly engages in revolutionary activities for the 
Party. His mission in the film is to pass a codebook to the Communist guerrilla. However, a traitor 
has exposed his identity to a Japanese military police officer, Hatoyama (“Jiushan” in Chinese, 
acted by Yuan Shihai), leading to Li’s subsequent arrest and torture. The failure of interrogation 
prompts Hatoyama to arrest Tiemei and the Grandma. Nevertheless, all three of them refuse to 
give away the codebook, resulting the execution of Li Yuhe and the Grandma. Tiemei is 
purposefully released under watch. With the help from her neighbors and an undercover comrade, 
she successfully passes the codebook to guerrilla that foils the Japanese soldiers’ attack. 
 
 
 
 17 
Ideology 
The film makes a simplistic portray of its characters. Every character can be classified into 
either the protagonist camp or the antagonist camp with absolutely no ambiguity. There is no 
display of internal struggle within any character, and no heterogeneity within each camp. 
Structurally, the ideology is of perfect consistency. 
The protagonist camp shares the following traits: They are all Chinese. They are all 
underclass (working class). They are all communists (Party members or sympathizers). They 
strongly support Chairman Mao. When mentioning the Communist Party, they usually add 
“Chairman Mao,” implying an equal status of the two names (e.g., 63:21). The members of the 
antagonist camp — only two of which are named — share the following trait: They are all rooted 
for the Japanese invasion. Notably, the Japanese military official, Hatoyama, admits the 
Communists’ ability in his monologues for multiple times (e.g., 64:50). He is also revealed to be 
a former doctor (a bourgeois occupation), who is “rich” (55:27).  
Those characteristics in each camp are not inherently associated with one another. Altering 
one or more of them does not always affect the plot’s consistency. For instance, the protagonist 
camp could be supporters of Chiang Kai-shek, his Nationalist Party, and his government. The 
protagonists could be of upper-middle class, sympathetic to the communists — or not, and support 
the war against Japanese invaders. Therefore, the combinations and division of camps are 
deliberately designed in this particular way to regiment sentiments and promote ideologies — ones 
that are in favor of the protagonist camp’s characteristics (i.e., communism, Mao’s leadership, 
anti-imperialism), and are against the antagonist camp’s (i.e., imperialist invasion, bourgeois 
tendency).  
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The evidence is — and this is ultimately the only possible evidence which will be used as 
a test applying to all films in this study — that some of the characteristics themselves are emotion-
evoking. For instance, the willing to sacrifice oneself for a cause, as opposed to the self-serving 
motive that Hatoyama openly advocates for (58:00) and the traitor applies, is considered positive 
by social norm. Also, in the Communist regime, being poor, exploited working class evokes 
positive sentiments, whereas being rich implies exploitation. 
Visual presentations and sound effects are also notable emotion evokers in this film. 
Protagonists, especially Li Yuhe, are frequently given close-ups, in which they are given chances 
to express their qualities such as bravery — with the help of forceful sound effects (e.g., 62:35). 
For characters of the other camp, however, the camera rarely features their facial expressions at 
all. Instead, the camera usually keeps a certain distance from them, with no sound effect. The 
posture of the two camps’ characters are different, too. For instance, Li Yuhe always stands 
straight, speaking sonorously while Hatoyama always stands with a stoop, speaking in high pitch 
with sinister smile or desperate anger.  
In terms of signification, the red lantern (signal lamp), featured in the film’s title, is the 
most notable symbol (see Figure 1). A part of Li Yuhe’s work, this object serves no substantial 
function in the plot, except for being an occasional signal for covert mission. An incarnation of the 
“revolutionary” camp’s motive, it provides a rationale for the Li’s actions as the Grandma openly 
attributes the lantern as a guidance for the poor and the workers, and also, an heirloom that bond 
the family together. In one sense, the embodiment of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao, or 
more abstractly, a political cause or an ideology, is superior than family bonding since even when 
given chance (as Hatoyama threatens to execute the whole family), family members are willing to 
not just sacrifice themselves but other members for this cause.  
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Also, the power structure of the lamp’s function has been altered. Instead of being a tool 
for its holders to give signals (orders), the lantern in film is, contrarily, giving orders (guidance) to 
the characters. Despite the absence of the authority per se, the film through this symbol conveys 
its supreme status. In this regard, and in consistency with the title, the lantern is the theme, whereas 
even the protagonist hero and the McGuffin codebook are rather peripheral.  
To sum up without definite categorization, we can conclude that the film delivers strong 
(consistent) ideological messages on primarily the exclusive level, emphasizing pro-Mao, pro-
CCP, pro-working-class, anti-Japanese / anti- “imperialist,”13 anti-bourgeois ideologies. The text 
itself, presenting a narrative without the author’s stance differentiated from it, does not invite 
consciousness, or any reflection, of its subjectivity. 
 
13 The quotation mark is put to note the term’s nature as a floating signifier, especially when the term is 
applied to real life persons, entities, policies, actions, etc., blurring the line between exclusivity and universality. 
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Figure 1. The “red lantern” as a recurring symbol (27:19, 100:59, 112:02, The Legend of the Red Lantern) 
3.3 Start an Undertaking (“创业,” 1974) 
Context 
Directed by Yu Yanfu and produced by Changchun Film Studio, Start an Undertaking 
(1974) survived Jiang Qing and her fellows’ harsh criticism to become one of the most influential 
feature films made during the late Culture Revolution. Its survival was a result of Mao’s 
permission: “The film has no major mistake. Distribution is suggested.”14 It was ten years after the 
Chinese Communist Party’s nine editorials’ criticism on Soviet Communist Party (1963 to 1964), 
 
14 Cited in Zhang Boshu, From May Fourth to June Fourth: A Critique of 20th Century Chinese Despotism 
(“从五四到六四: 20 世纪中国专制主义批判”) , 36. 
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and despite Khrushchev’s removal from office, the relation of the two states remained at all-time 
low, with occasional military conflicts. Facing a common adversary, the United States and the 
Communist China began to “normalize” relations. The U.S. President Nixon visited China and met 
Mao in 1972, followed by the release of the Shanghai Communiqué. 
 
Plot 
Beginning with scenes from Yuming oilfield, where workers like Zhou Tingshan (Zhang 
Lianwen), aided by communist agents, have protected the facilities from fleeing enemies’ 
(presumably the Nationalists, and their American consultant — acted by Pang Wanling) desperate 
destruction, the film tells the story of Daqing, a newfound potential field that would help the 
nascent People’s Republic with its struggling energy supply. The difficult situation, including the 
limited resources, largely portrayed as a result of (Soviet) revisionists’ and capitalist imperialists’ 
blockade, prompts Feng Chao (Liu Guoxiang), the vice head of the project, and Zhang Yizhi (Chen 
Ying), the chief geologist who back in Yuming has refused to leave with the American consultant, 
to support a more conservative approach in the prospecting operation. Zhou Tingshan, however, 
disagrees with such policy. He enthusiastically advocates for a more proactive method for every 
potential oil well. The head of the project, Hua Cheng (Li Rentang), sides with Zhou, and yet the 
plan is then jeopardized by a peasant who has been angered by Feng’s response to his concern 
about his farmland. The work resumes after the incident, but during the work, Feng then under-
rations food supply for Zhou’s team. Upset by Feng’s undermining calculations, Zhou purchases 
potatoes from a peasant, leading to accusations of his capitalist tendency. In a conference, he firmly 
confronts with Feng and ends up being praised for diligence and altruism. Finally persuaded by 
Zhou, who, after studying Mao’s “On Contradiction,” has found a way to carry out the plan, the 
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geologist Zhang refuses to be swayed again by Feng, who cites political consequences if and when 
the plan that they have once vehemently opposed turns out to be a success. Meanwhile, the 
“modern revisionists” completely cuts off the oil supply to China, leaving Feng attempting to 
scaling down the plan. With Hua’s support, Zhou, mobilizing the masses’ workforce to produce 
“home made” gasoline, leads the team to work even harder. In the end, Feng is criticized by people 
for his dissenting views. He is then arrested after being revealed to be historically anti-
revolutionary and secretly obstructing the current project. With people’s hard work led by Zhou, 
the struggle of Daqing ends with a great success upon which the country’s almost self-sufficient 
oil supply is based. 
 
Ideology 
The depiction of characters in this film remains stereotypical in its political context, 
although it is more nuanced than many of its peers. The protagonist, Zhou Tingshan, is an 
exemplary model worker that the Communist Party frequently showcased. In fact, the character is 
likely to be based on the real story of Wang Jinxi, who also worked from Yumen oilfield to Daqing. 
He has many qualities that evoke positive emotions. The following are the most notable ones: First, 
he is caring, kind, and altruistic. It is depicted in several scenes, including the most obvious one, 
in which he is found to be sharing his corn buns to seemingly everyone in his working group 
persistently. Second, he is industrious — often working hard overtime voluntarily. He even once 
escaped from hospital to join the work. Third, he is always empirically correct. Fourth, in many 
occasions, including the aforementioned ones, his appearance, including many smiling close-up 
shots, are backed by upbeat background music. Fifth, he is a devout believer of Chairman Mao, 
Lenin (e.g., 99:20), the Party (e.g., 41:33), and the regime —which as a whole is not just a target, 
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but also an emotion evoker in the political context. Six, he advocates for Mao’s policies, including 
mass movement, independence (self-sufficiency, e.g., 35:40 to 35:47), and voluntarism. 
Hua shares many qualities of Zhou’s: being loyal to the Party, sticking to Mao’s teaching, 
caring about the working people (e.g., 66:53 when he covers a napping Zhou with his own coat 
with pleasant background music), etc. He is also against conservative policies and for voluntarism. 
On the contrary, Feng Chao is depicted with mostly negativities. He not only opposes the 
more radical policy, but also opportunistically shifts his position, concealing his opinions for his 
own benefits (e.g., 36:10), and keeps making obstacles in the project for his own political and 
material interests (101:24). He is historically anti-revolutionary. When he talks to Zhang, 
disturbingly loud thunder can be heard in the background. Lightning creates unsettling effects on 
his hand as he gives a cigarette to an undecided Zhang.   
Zhang Yizhi’s depiction is mostly positive but to some extent mixed. He is one of the few 
characters who in a certain regard has an arc. Zhang refuses to leave China with an arrogant 
American consultant, a form of patriotism constructed to be a positive sentiment provoker. But he 
often sides with Feng Chao, putting his expertise, scientific professionalism (e.g. 47:13 to 48:24, 
in which he asserts his geological survey, leaving Zhou, who — not entirely consistent with his 
radical approach — proposes a second examination, sighing “the old problem again”) and a more 
cautionary working approach over the mass mobilization policy and Mao’s voluntarism, against 
what is depicted to be the Party’s will. But eventually, he abandons his original beliefs, and 
sincerely supports the praised protagonist Zhou. When he opines his opposition, there is sometimes 
ominous background music with close-ups of startled, silent meeting attendees.  
Character arcs enable possibilities of a different reading of the film’s message. When a 
character is associated with partly negative emotion evokers (a negative bait), one could 
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understand that the author intends to weaken the message, acknowledging that those who are 
“wrong” (or simply opposing to the leadership’s decision) on one occasion are not necessarily 
wrong in every regard. But alternatively, one can also interpret that, especially when the context 
has perpetuated a black-and-white reading of a text, even the seemingly not so negative target is 
negative enough and should be treated as a villain. The difference between Zhang and Feng seems 
to reflect, according to the filmmakers, where the fine line is drawn, but the confounding factors 
— that Zhang’s opposition has been proven wrong and that he sincerely acknowledges his 
mistakes — make one wonder whether such a person is supposed to be tolerated by this ideology 
were he or she insists his or her dissenting opinion. There might be more political implication in 
terms of the growing intolerance of dissents in the domestic purge, but this character — a “bad” 
or “pseudo” communist (see Zhou’s hardly veiled accusation at 101:50), may also have to do with 
an international feud, referring to the Soviets.  
Although briefly touching (American) “imperialism,” the film has a more frequent and 
pointed criticism of “revisionism,” albeit, curiously, without naming the Soviet Union or its allies. 
At 42:55, after telling Zhou to beware of international hostility, Hua states that “they” (“enemies,” 
unnamed) sell low quality oil at price twice as much as that of capitalists’ market. At 68:45, Hua 
claims that “in their place, satellites rise to sky, yet the red flag falls onto the ground,” and “books 
of Lenin have been abandoned.” He warns that enemies may take advantage of China’s difficulties 
resulting from natural disaster to disrupt the country even under the rhetoric of revolution. At some 
points, Feng is depicted to echo this “revisionist” logic: at 102:12, the film associates Feng with 
the revisionists. Feng, after defending his communist identity, claims that “disregarding the 
international condition, we are in for disadvantage.” Previously (75:13), seemingly out of nowhere, 
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he murmurs, “offending a rich friend…an invitation to trouble!” — a deliberate link to the Soviet 
dispute.  
The film also raises a question of the ownership of the oilfield, putting scientists at odds 
with workers. At 112:09, Feng asks Zhang, by giving up scientific plan, letting workers to make 
decisions, “who is the owner of the oilfield?” Feng emphasizes that, it is still scientists who decide 
and workers who drill accordingly. By this logic, the film implies the equivalence of ownership 
and decision-making.  
A rich peasant, Long Fugui, serves a minor role in the film. He relocates the sign (40:20) 
on the oilfield for his own interest and is criticized by some cadres. One suggests that his behavior 
is counterrevolutionary and should be arrested. Feng claims that this is an inherent problem of the 
rich peasant’s class, and the person should be educated.  
The ideological subjectivity is most obvious in an over two minutes clip from 54:30 to 
57:07 after a close-up of Zhou raising his head from a book he is reading, saying “[…] our 
undertaking relies on the two essays; learning a bit is like crossing a mountain”15 It is a music 
video with lyrics that praise the industrious workers (displayed in the clip), the Party, “Beijing” 
(referring to the power center, with Tiananmen shown, see Figure 2), Chairman Mao (who “leads 
us forward”), and the “revolutionary prospect.”  
 
 
15 “On Practice,” “On Contradiction,” — both were written by Mao Zedong.  
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Figure 2. “Looking to Beijing, brimming with deep affection” (55:13, Start an Undertaking) 
 
To roughly sum up without definite categorization, we can conclude that the film delivers 
dominantly strong ideological messages on primarily the exclusive level, emphasizing pro-Mao, 
pro-Regime / patriotism, anti-Soviet-bloc / anti- “revisionist,” anti-American-bloc / anti- 
“imperialist,” voluntarist ideologies.  
3.4 Sparkling Red Star (“闪闪的红星,” 1974) 
Context 
Adapted from a namesake story published in 1972, directed by Li Jun and Li Ang, produced 
by August First Film Studio, Sparkling Red Star is an extremely rare piece that takes up the genre 
conventions of a war film, a children’s film, and a musical at the same time.  
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Plot 
Set in the civil war between the Nationalist government and the Communist Party during 
the 1930s, the film features Pan Dongzi (Zhu Xinyun), a pre-adolescent boy living in the 
countryside where a landlord, Hu Hansan (Liu Jiang), who has been treating the peasants 
tyrannically, flees before the Communists’ takeover. Pan welcomes the Red Army and actively 
takes military duty, guarding against Kuomintang and Hu’s return. However, due to the Party’s 
failed “left-leaning policy” that ousts “Chairman Mao,” the Red Army has to retreat. Pan’s father 
(Zhao Ruping), a fearless Communist soldier, leaves the village with the army, and the mother (Li 
Xuehong), who newly joins the Party, dies in a fire set by Hu’s people as she fights against them. 
Pan Dongzi, raised by peasants and a Communist soldier, helps the rebellion by smuggling salt 
and collecting intelligence as an undercover child labor in a rice store that supplies the Nationalist 
military. In the Red Army’s surprise attack, he eventually takes the opportunity to set a fire in Hu’s 
house, and singlehandedly kills Hu with a knife. After the victory, a result of restoration of Mao’s 
leadership, Pan is awarded a red star on his military hat, before his father returns home. 
 
Ideology  
The characters can once again be clearly divided into two camps: the protagonist camp, 
consisting of Pan’s family, Communist soldiers (the Red Army), and peasants; the antagonist 
camp, consisting of the landlord Hu Hansan, the rice shop owner, and the Kuomintang military.   
The protagonist camp is associated with positive emotion evokers. They are caring, as seen 
in the depiction of Red Army soldiers caressing the child tenderly (07:00 to 07:24); they are 
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altruistic and brave, as seen, for instance, in the father’s insistence of saving anesthetic for others 
(16:30) and the mother’s sacrifice in the fight.  
Besides the primal emotion evokers, they also have the following properties that mostly 
serve as ideological targets:  
First, an unconditional loyalty to the Communist Party, including its armed forces. It is 
depicted, for example, in the scene where she joins the Party. At that night, the mother says 
emotionally to Pan Dongzi after her pledge: “I have given myself wholly to the Party. I’ll do 
whatever the Party wants me to do, with all my heart” (35:06). Pan Dongzi replies enthusiastically, 
before embracing her mother: “Mommy, you belong to the Party, then I’m the son of the Party; 
I’ll also do whatever the Party wants me to do” (35:15). Another telling example is a soldier’s 
remark, “the Party is his [Pan Dongzi’s] real parents” (59:50). Also, the peasants depicted all 
welcome the Red Army and their military victories (e.g., 15:00, 48:30). 
Second, a deep reverence toward “Chairman Mao.”16 Characters of the protagonist camp 
frequently refer to Mao with cheerfulness (e.g., 36:15) Almost whenever the film mentions “the 
Communist Party,” or “the Central Party,” “Chairman Mao” comes right after — if not precedes 
— the name (e.g., 35:55). Being able to see Mao is considered a blessed opportunity by the children 
(78:12), and they aspire to meet Mao one day (79:48). In a conversation, Pan Dongzi claims Mao 
to be omniscient (79:27). 
 
16 Historically, the first time that Mao gained the title of “chairman” was in 1931, when he became that of 
the “Central Executive Committee” and “People’s Committee” of the “Chinese Soviet Republic.” 
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Third, a loyalty to the “Red Regime.” On multiple occasions, the adults in the protagonist 
camp tell Pan Dongzi that their goal is to (wipe out the enemies and) “defend the Red Regime” 
(09:40). 
Fourth, an eagerness and willingness to apply violence on perceived enemies. For instance, 
Pan Dongzi eagerly asks whether his father is making a lance for him, and the father replies 
joyfully: “as a member of Children’s Corps, you have to be armed,” leaving Dongzi dissatisfied 
for not getting a rifle. Pan Dongzi is also depicted to forcefully throw his lance at Hu (12:46). It is 
often accompanied with hatred toward enemies, as seen in Pan Dongzi’s vow to revenge his 
father’s wound. He claims that, “when I grow up, I will also fight the white17 dogs; I’ll let them 
bleed, too — bleed a lot” (18:26). The father replies, “[you will] just revenge me alone?” — 
suggesting that it is a revenge of many more people. Pan Dongzi’s killing of Hu Hansan is praised 
by his comrades (94:58).  
In the antagonist camp, characters are depicted to be hostile and abusive to poor people. 
Hu Hansan is said to have caused the death of Pan Dongzi’s grandfather (03:23). He also beats 
Pan Dongzi arbitrarily (05:51) and burns Pan’s mother to death. They are also wealthy, greedy, 
self-interested. The owner of the rice store would not sell the rice as demanded, only to raise the 
price and supply military afterwards. They loathe the poor people and their alleged Communist 
tendency (e.g., Hu’s comment on peasants found to smuggle salt, “[d]on’t you see, those unruly 
people are Red to their bones” [63:50]).  
 
17 “White” refers to the Kuomintang. The usage is originated from the Russian “White Army,” “white 
émigré,” etc. 
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A notable expression is in the voiceover — a manifestation of hyper-subjectivity. Through 
a grown-up Pan Dongzi’s mouth, it narrates that the Red Army’s withdrawal is a “left 
opportunist”18 mistake that has ousted Mao from leadership. This is significant in terms of the 
Cultural Revolution’s narrative since common characterizations often consider the Cultural 
Revolution to be a “left-wing” political movement. It also raises unintended possible inconsistency 
when Mao’s voluntarism and anti-revisionism are in the rhetoric of the same movement. However, 
this type of inconsistency would not be acknowledged in such texts, therefore would not change 
the strength of its ideology.  
Sound and visual effects all have ideological implications when they serve as emotion 
evokers. At night, a close-up of Pan Dongzi’s face apparently glows as he talks about Chairman 
Mao (e.g., 78:15). In terms of signification, a clip of sunrise — an image frequently associated 
with Mao19 cut into the dialog right after Pan Dongzi and his mother cheerfully refers to Chairman 
Mao for 23 seconds (36:16) with the music of “The East is Red” in the background. Throughout 
the film, the Red Star serves a recurring thematic symbol on multiple occasions (e.g., 07:24, 08:15, 
08:39, 72:42). The Star, representing as abstract as a revolutionary cause or as concrete as the 
Communist military, in some sequence takes over the camera’s focus (e.g., 07:24) and in some 
cases precedes its focus on others (e.g., 07:25, 08:39). The non-diegetic music in the film often 
comes with blatantly ideological lyrics. When Pan Dongzi is on the bamboo raft, a song chanting 
 
18 In the original film, the wording is “zuoqing,” which literally means “left-leaning,” but it could also connote 
“left-deviation,” a tendency of premature advance, sometimes come with quotation marks as in “‘left’ opportunist.” 
In the official dubbed version of the film, the wording is “left opportunist”— it is unknown that whether the “left” is 
in quotation marks.   
19 In “The East is Red,” for example, Mao is compared to a rising sun. 
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“keep Party’s teachings in mind” and “follow the Party like their fathers” (e.g., 71:20) is in the 
background.  
To roughly sum up without definite categorization, we can conclude that the film delivers 
dominantly strong ideological messages on primarily the exclusive level, emphasizing pro-Mao, 
pro-Party, pro-Regime, pro-proletarian, anti-Kuomintang, anti- “bourgeois,” anti- “feudalist” 
ideologies. The intertextual inconsistency, very likely to be unintended, hardly affects the 
ideological strength. The use of voiceover is a vessel of hyper-subjectivity and does not distance 
itself from the audience.  
3.5 Haixia (“海霞,” 1974) 
Context 
A rare piece featuring a heroine as the leading character, Haixia is an adaption of a novel 
published in 1966 named “Islander Female Militia” (Haidao Nüminbin). Produced by Beijing Film 
Studio, it is co-directed by Qian Jiang, Chen Huaikai, and Wang Haowei. In the credits, the film 
acknowledges the assistance from the People’s Liberation Army.  
The representation of female fighters was not unprecedented, however. Famously, The Red 
Detachment of Women (1970) — a recording of ballet performance adapted from the 1961 
namesake directed by Xie Jin is among the eight model dramas in the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Plot 
In a fishing village on a small southern Chinese island, Li Bashisi (Yu Wenzhong), chooses 
to abandon his infant daughter who he can no longer support due to poverty. The girl (Cai Ming), 
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drifting to the sea, is saved by another villager, Uncle Liu, who names her “Haixia” after the 
beaming sunglow bathing the shore.  
In the village, the local fishing overlord, Chen Zhan’ao is revealed by fishermen, including 
Li and Liu, to have been taking advantage of them with a rigged scale. Later, Liu and Li are killed 
by Chen’s people before Liu’s house also being burned down. After Chen’s accountant You Ergou 
“reclaims” her fishing boat, Haixia’s mother is found dead in her bed. At one time, Kuomintang 
soldiers trespass Haixia’s home and rudely expropriate their food. 
 Fighting Kuomintang on the island, Communist soldiers friendly exchange their rice for 
the grass Haixia eats. Haixia then voluntarily helps these soldiers in the war. The Kuomintang 
forces are driven out, but Chen and some of his fellows remain at large. 
The grownup Haixia (Wu Haiyan) joins the Communist-led militia and guards against the 
enemies. As a platoon leader, she also helps other women join the militia, and educates men who 
look down upon female soldiers. One day, a stranger, Liu Atai (Yu Shaokang), claiming to be 
seeking a lost relative, comes to live on the island. Meanwhile, Haixia loses her post due to an 
unusual accident during night patrol. In an investigation, Haixia finds that Liu Atai has been 
conspiring with You Ergou. After communications with enemies are found out, Liu Atai is 
revealed to be the pirate who used to kill for Chen Zhan’ao. At the night of the plotted attack, 
Chen, who comes from the sea with Kuomintang soildiers, is killed by Haixia. 
 
Ideology 
The characters can once again be divided into two camps. The protagonist is Haixia, and 
her camp includes fellow villagers and the Communist soldiers, whereas the antagonist’s camp 
includes the overlord Chen Zhan’ao, the pirate Liu Atai, the Kuomintang soldiers.  
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Characters in the protagonist camp largely share the following qualities: altruistic (e.g., 
Uncle Liu saves Haixia; Communist soldiers give their rice to Haixia; Haixia brings boiled water 
for the soldiers), supporting the Communist Party (e.g., 95:41), supporting the Communist regime 
(e.g., 95:55), supporting Mao (whose works and demands are frequently referred to, e.g., 40:13, 
where Haixia reads his book, 81:21, where Haixia cites his “everyone is a soldier” teaching, 95:46, 
where people directly praise Mao for bringing them the great life), pro-proletarian (e.g., 95:31), 
anti-feudalist (landlord, represented by Chen Zhan’ao), anti-“capitalist”/ anti-Kuomintang (e.g., 
94:45). Notably, Haixia and her female fellows in the film frequently promote gender equality. 
They refuse to stick to traditional roles of women and reject some stereotypes of women. They are 
portrayed to be active in the militia, and often compete with men in their training. The protagonist 
camp, on the contrary, appears to be rude (e.g., Kuomintang soldiers at 23:34 to 24:54), deceitful 
(e.g., Chen Zhan’ao’s rigged scale), and abusive (e.g., taking people’s property by force). 
The narrative of the plot is highly subjective. The film begins with the frame of a grown-
up Haixia’s personal account, through a voiceover, of her transformative experience due to “the 
Liberation.” She says:  
In the old society, people like us were soaked in bitter water. At that time, I had  
eyes yet could not see, had mouth yet could not talk. Nowadays, the Party has 
sharpened my vigilance. I can now not only see the island, the motherland, but 
also the world. […] Today, we live in the happy socialist era. But never will we 
forget the past miseries (0:30). 
 
The film also ends with her voiceover which calls for people to learn the lesson guarding 
against enemies. The body of the story is therefore completely her personal perspective, and there 
is not much room for alternative reading in the whole text. By no means can we observe any 
technique that is used to distance the audience from its narrative, warning the subjectivity of what 
is told and how it is told. 
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The sound corresponds with Haixia’s narrative. For example, epic music is in the 
background while Haixia make the aforementioned opening statement. Mao’s portraits frequently 
appear when Haixia is present (e.g., 56:48, 70:04).  
To roughly sum up without definite categorization, the film delivers strong ideological 
message on an exclusive level, emphasizing pro-Mao, pro-Party, pro-Regime, pro-proletarian, pro- 
gender equality, anti-Kuomintang, anti- “feudalist” ideologies. The use of voiceover is a vessel of 
hyper-subjectivity and does not distance itself from the audience. 
3.6 Breaking with Old Ideas (“决裂,” 1975) 
Context 
Breaking with Old Ideas (1975), produced by Beijing Film Studio and directed by Li 
Wenhua, came one year before the death of Mao and the fall of the Gang of Four, and two years 
before Hua Guofeng formally declared the “victorious end” of the revolution in the Eleventh 
Party’s Congress.20  
Previously in 1973, Mao, and then in 1974, People’s Daily, began to criticize Confucius, 
who was referred to by Soviet propaganda to contrast the unbenevolent, undemocratic ideology in 
Mao’s China, which was compared to legalism. Especially in the following “Criticize Lin, 
Criticize Confucian” movement started by Jiang Qing, the target was extended to Lin Biao (died 
 
20 Hua Guofeng, “十一大上的政治报告” (“Political Report on the Eleventh National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China”).  
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in a failed coup in 1971), who according to Mao was a supporter of Confucianism — so was the 
Kuomintang. Lin was deemed far-left and later far-right by Mao. 
The school the film is based on, the Jiangxi Communist Labor University, was founded in 
1958. In 1962, Mao wrote a letter to the university, praising its practice.21 
During the Cultural Revolution, higher education in its conventional form was virtually 
non-existent. Previously, students already had to go through political background check for 
admission. Since 1966, universities had ceased to admit new students. Starting from 1968, after 
Mao met and encouraged the Red Guards multiple times in 1966, the intensified “Down to the 
Countryside Movement” sent school-aged youths (“educated youth”) to the countryside en masse 
for alternative education. In the same year, Mao’s comment on a new report of professional 
training in a factory became “Seven-Twenty-One Instruction,” demanding schools to train workers 
and peasants before putting them back to production. Many “7/21 Universities” were founded 
consequently at that time. 
 
Plot 
The film tells the story of a newly established “communist labor university.” Long 
Guozheng (Guo Zhenqing), the head and a worker of a collective plantation, is summoned by the 
local vice party secretary, Tang Ning (Wen Xiying), to be the principal and party secretary of this 
university. Contrary to the proposal of vice principle Cao Zhonghe (Chen Ying) that positions the 
school close to the city, Long locates it in the countryside. Rejecting the admission policy set by 
 
21 Mao Zedong, “給江西共產主義勞動大學的一封信” (“A Letter to Jiangxi Communist Labor 
University”). 
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director Sun Ziqing (Ge Cunzhuang), Long also disregards exam scores and diploma as 
qualification, judging applicants solely on their political background (e.g., class label), political 
participation, labor skills, and work experience.  
Following the admission, Long also works with students in mountains to build classrooms, 
opposes a teaching outline that is beyond students’ capability, and stands with a student who 
openly calls for less “unpractical” lectures on locally uncommon horses. Adopting ideas proposed 
by a peasant representative (Zhang Zheng), Long is determined to merge work and learning to one 
in this university. Unconvinced, Cao and an official (Bao Lie) see an arranged visit to more 
“formal” universities as an opportunity for Long to change his mind. However, the students he 
observes — inconsiderate toward peasants’ work, loathing countryside homes — further convince 
him of his own ideas. 
Meanwhile, at school, after finding a massive insect attack, students volunteer to help in 
the fields. As a result, some of them fail to finish the exam and are consequently expelled by Cao. 
Back to university, Long is angered by this incident. He revokes Cao’s decision, and confronted 
Cao on his “feudal-bourgeois” ideology. After several other incidents, including a self-interested 
student (Yu Fagen [Wang Binglin]) that he misjudges, Sun Ziqing realizes his past mistakes. Cao, 
however, continues to suppress students’ appeal against a land privatization policy, and takes part 
in a criticism and denunciation meeting against a student, Li Jinfeng (Wang Suya). In this meeting, 
Long reversely praises students like Li and denounces the leaders who hold the meeting as “taking 
a capitalist path.” 
Long is subsequently threatened by Zhao to be dismissed from office. Zhao even proposes 
to terminate this school. But soon, the university receives a letter from Chairman Mao, who praises 
the path the university has taken. People cheer, crying out loud “long live Chairman Mao,” and 
 38 
the films ends in Long’s call for continued struggle and breaking away with old ownership model 
and other traditional ideas.  
 
Ideology 
This film shares more similarities with Start an Undertaking than others in terms of the 
characters given that, in both cases, the dramatic conflicts are party infightings. Still, the characters 
in Breaking with Old Ideas can be divided into two categories, with the exception of Sun Ziqing’s 
subtler case. Long is undoubtedly the protagonist, and Cao antagonist. The peasants and students 
(except for Yu Fageng, who later repents, and his father) are aligned with Long, and vice versa. 
Cao, Zhao, together with Sun (before changing his mind), are antagonists.  
Long, the peasants, and students are associated with an educational policy that prioritizes 
the “proletarian” — the agrarian in particular — political identity over academic professionalism, 
whereas the antagonists deny this idea and dismiss the formers’ accusation of representing 
“bourgeois.” In a conversation, after being accused of bourgeois tendency by Long, Cao responds 
with a telling line (59:38): 
                        Oh, “it is of bourgeoise!” Then “two plus two equals four” — what class is that  
of? And what class nature does “x plus y” have?... As long as we can cultivate  
talents with high scientific and cultural knowledge, isn’t it serving socialism  
anyway! 
 
In fact, this is essentially the only “ideological” difference between the two camps. In no 
other significant way are Long and Cao associated differently. Long and Cao are equally humble 
(see 06:45, 41:15). They both yell at people when trying to make their point (see 87:55, 88:50). If 
anything, they are from different class background — while Cao grows up in an intellectual family 
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(89:10), Long is from a humbler origin (90:00). Long cites Mao more (e.g., 35:26, 90:10, 95:29) 
while the antagonists do not. 
In many ways, the core conflict is a dispute on orthodoxy. The status of Party, the regime, 
and “socialism” are established, unquestioned, underlying norm. The questions are: what do those 
ideas mean? What is the correct interpretation? Long, threatened to be expelled from the Party, 
remarks (116:43): 
                        Utilizing the power that the Party and the people bestow on you, you are able to  
do that. But that does not make you correct, doesn’t make you reasonable. Truth 
is not held by you. […] That the enemies hate and vilify us is nothing strange, 
since they are enemies. It is you who are strange: singing the same tunes with the 
enemies! 
 
The film, with its high subjectivity, achieved by and evident in the cinematography, the 
use of music, sound effects, etc., takes the stance the protagonist’s interpretation: the proletarian 
politics is above everything else. However, the ultimate judgment is realized by simply a letter 
from Mao, which, by this logic, becomes the de facto court of appeal, the source of supreme 
authority.  
The most subjective part in which the protagonist is featured to call for “breaking with old 
ideas” (see Figure 3) without audience in the film is notable in that, although this is a clear moment 
when the character delivers ideologically-laden messages directly to the viewer, he still would not 
look at the camera. By not even breaking the fourth wall, the film does not disclose its subjectivity, 
seeking no distance from its viewers.  
To sum up without definite categorization, we can conclude that the film delivers primarily 
exclusive pro-Mao, pro-Party, pro-Regime, and a “proletarian” educational policy political 
messages in a consistent manner. The film is highly subjective yet does not seek to distance the 
audience. 
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Figure 3. Speaking directly to the viewer without breaking the fourth wall (121:42, Breaking with Old Ideas) 
3.7 Summary 
Judging on the selected films, cinema in the Cultural Revolution are made to appear 
consistent — within each text as well as among the texts. In every film, there is a usually clear 
division of camps, and the filmmakers’ subjective stance is always clear: audience can hardly be 
confused about the filmmakers’ message and everyone is expected to read the messages in the 
same way. A viewer who holds a particular type of political belief — one that the filmmakers 
intend to shape one towards — can hardly find herself being challenged in a Cultural Revolution 
film. Intertextually, a viewer who is not challenged by one of the films is also very unlikely to be 
challenged by another one of the them. 
Being consistent, or more accurately, rhetorically consistent, does not mean that they are 
indeed consistent. In Sparkling Red Star, the policy ousting Mao is narrated as “left-leaning” 
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mistake, whereas in Start an Undertaking, being radical is the Mao’s way and being conservative 
is an antagonist’s characteristic.   
That raises the question: what is the criterion-setting supreme message? In other words, 
which are derivative, and which is the parent message, if there is such a distinction? The options 
are likely to be a version of extreme “left-wing” ideology, the Party-State’s ruling, or the authority 
of Mao. It is unknown, since rarely are they put against each other — there is no way to find out 
what one is supposed to do, for instance, when Mao no longer endorses the same version “left-
wing” ideology he signatures, or the Party-State he effectively controls. Even when Long in 
Breaking with the Old Idea ostensibly challenge the Party’s establishment, this protagonist is not 
challenging the ultimate establishment — Mao.     
But the fact that Mao is always depicted as embodiment of the “correct” doctrine is utterly 
dubious especially given that the ubiquitous reference of Mao would not be necessary were Mao 
to be revered because of what he stands for, instead of, because Mao defines correctness. In this 
regard, the message is more likely to be on the exclusive level. 
Also, being highly subjective does not mean that the films seek to leave room for the viewer 
to be aware of its subjectivity. Instead, in all those direct address to viewer, the characters never 
break the fourth wall. To be fair, breaking the fourth wall is not necessarily an act of distancing — 
it could be considering the viewer’s part of the theater. But not breaking the fourth wall would 
make any reminder of the artifact nature of the filmic text impossible when there is no other forms 
of self-reference at all. 
To sum up without definite categorization, judging from the five analyzed texts, we can 
conclude that films in the Cultural Revolution tend to collectively reflect a consistent — that is, 
ideologically strong — political message, on primarily the exclusive level, emphasizing positive 
 42 
sentiments of Mao personally, from whom the positive sentiments of a version of “radical left” 
ideology and the political apparatus (the Party, the military, the state) derive. 
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4.0 French Cinema “in” May ’6822 
4.1 Overview of the Political and Cinematic Context 
The year 1968 marked a decade of de Gaulle’s rule. Ten years before, the General’s 
resumption of presidency was in many regards not a result of genuine popular demand, but rather, 
a desperate fallback in a time of deep uncertainty. The growingly violent Algerian War caused a 
political and potentially military turmoil in France proper, where responding policies were 
gridlocked by the Fourth Republic’s parliamentary feud. Public opinion also saw more reflection 
on the country’s oppressive colonialism, especially in light of France’s own fate in the World War 
II. 
Ostensibly, the President de Gaulle had been successful. His rhetoric and tactics alleviated 
the tension in Algeria. His vision for a more “presidential” constitution was approved in a 
referendum. He managed to explore a more independent foreign policy that refrained from leaning 
too much on either bloc. However, his governing style in the following ten years was characterized 
by many as dictatorial.23 
In terms of socioeconomic aspects, it was also a period of rapid modernization for the 
country. France was experiencing a drastic transition, known as “thirty glorious years,” from a 
 
22 As mentioned, the “May ’68 films” selected here are not necessarily made during the movement, but rather 
contemporaneously inspired by its social conditions. 
23 Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of 
the 1960s 
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heavily agricultural economy to one that featured increased number of middle-class professionals. 
The consumerist society in many ways became more “open,” if superficial, but the social apparatus 
often remained conservative. Responding to the society’s expanding need for trained professionals, 
universities during that period admitted 36,000 more students before awkwardly downsizing the 
number due to unmatched employment prospects for graduates.24 
The ten years, from 1958 to 1968, was also a significant moment in the history of cinema. 
Inspired by various theories discussed in the magazine Cahiers du cinema, directors began to 
experiment with new techniques to express personal ideas. In this “New Wave,” directors such as 
François Truffaut and Jean-Luc Godard considered themselves (and were considered to be) 
“auteurs” of their works.  
The core events of May ’68 were started by protesting students (who on the surface were 
initially dissatisfied with conservative dormitory policies) with workers joining later. The tension 
between demonstrators and the authorities escalated quickly with different political forces seeking 
to tilt the cluster of ideologies in this movement to their favored direction. Sympathizers from 
various fields also expressed their solidarity with the protesters, including the academic 
intellectuals, celebrities, and artists. The 21st Cannes Film Festival, held in that month, was 
significantly affected by the incidents. Some filmmakers, including Godard and Truffaut, called 
for reform or even complete shutdown of the film festival. As a result of the turmoil, the festival 
was ended five days earlier than scheduled, with no award given for that year.25  
 
24 Ibid, 51. 
25 Tobias Grey, “Flashback: Cannes 1968.” 
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4.2 La Chinoise (1967) 
Context 
In 1967, the United States was fighting in Vietnam — a former French colony — against 
Communists supported by China and the USSR. In France, having learned to be strategically 
moderate in previous electoral disappointments, the French Communist Party, an important 
political force of opposition, was still ideologically aligned with the post-Stalin Soviet Union. Yet 
the influence of Maoism began to pick up among the left, leading some to mark the year 
“Chinese.”26 
By this year, Jean-Luc Godard had already gained fame for critically claimed works 
including Breathless (1960) and Band of Outsiders (1964). His previous films frequently touched 
ideology-laden subjects but were not as explicitly political as his La Chinoise in 1967. His political 
ideas — in filmmaking as well as (other forms of) activism — became more notable since this film 
in this year before May ’68. 
The script of La Chinoise to some extent parallels Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Possessed — 
a political satire as well as tragedy depicting the nihilism of various young radicals in a Russian 
town. 
 
Plot 
 
26 Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of 
the 1960s, 113. 
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The body of the film, or at least parts of which, is presented as “a film in the making.” In 
1967, in a borrowed apartment that is decorated with communist slogans and posters, a few young 
people are gathered to discuss Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. In front of the camera, the 
characters give interviews in turn. Citing an example of Chinese students protesting in Moscow, 
Guillaume (Jean-Pierre Léaud) talks about the nature of theater, explaining why a sincere acting 
is nothing deceptive. Yvonne (Juliet Berto) talks about her early life experience in a village, and 
her hardships of finding jobs in the city, where she sometimes prostitutes herself for a living or to 
buy things. Admitting the contradictions in her life, she then expresses distrust of the Russians for 
antagonizing the Maoist China. A guest speaker, Omar (Omar Diop)27 then gives a talk on Stalin’s 
intellectual dogmatism, the future of Marxist philosophy, and class struggle — which, according 
to him, would not end even under socialism. In the speech, he quotes Lenin to criticize the “lies” 
of Brezhnev (21:53). Véronique (Anne Wiazemsky) says that in the suburb outside Nanterre, with 
some Algerian kids and factory workers, she found the “three basic inequalities of capitalism”28 
especially those of the “Gaullist regime.” She also expresses her wish to dynamite Sorbonne, the 
Louvre, and the Comédie-Française. Growing up in a family of bankers, she is ashamed for 
profiting from the economic system. She then cites a book claiming that exams are also unfair 
because they are created for full-time students, and that they cause anxiety as well as “sexual 
frustration.” But she says that books should not be banned, because, in that case, they would not 
have the opportunity to be criticized.  
 
27 Omar Blondin Diop (1946-1973) was a Senegalese intellectual and activist who attended university in 
France before being expelled from the country. An important figure in the post-1968 rebellion, he was an active 
member of Young Marxist-Leninist Movement of Senegal. In 1973, he died in a Senegalese prison. 
28 The inequality between “intellectual and manual work,” “town and country,” “farming and industry.”   
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Guillaume then discusses news media and current events. He proposes a different 
understanding of reality and fiction, stating that, contrary to popular belief, the filmmaker Méliès, 
who made fictional works, were in fact documenting current events “like Brecht,” because of the 
importance of “conscientious” analysis. He then reenacts and comments on different states’ roles 
in the Vietnam War with sunglasses of different flags: Americans are cruel and immoral, the 
Russians cowardly and hypocritical, the Chinese progressive and brave. Britain and France are 
among the “onlookers.” Citing President Johnson’s different treatment of “Communists” in Europe 
and in Asia, he says that there are “two kinds of communisms:” the real one that is still “dangerous” 
(to “imperialist” America), and one (“the Russians and their friends”) that has become 
“revisionists.” The situation, as he sees it, is that the revisionists and imperialists are allied against 
China. He further claims that he is for the just wars, against the unjust ones.  
Véronique in the interview continues to criticize the French Communist Party for being 
close to Russia. She also says that intellectuals like Sartre are hiding in their studies. That was 
followed by the talk of Kirilov (Lex de Bruijin), who addresses the problem of obscure language 
and socialist art which was “knifed at back” by the likes of Trotsky.  
After a speech considered by fellows as “revisionist,” Henri (Michel Semeniako), who had 
been allegedly beaten by members of Sorbonne Marxist-Leninist group previously, votes against 
his majority fellows’ plan to build a terrorist group. In an interview following his exclusion, Henri, 
in favor of “peaceful coexistence,” further dismisses the Maoists as fanatics detached from reality. 
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On a train, Véronique exchanges opinions about her terrorist plan with Francis Jeanson 
(Francis Jeanson)29 who tries to talk her out of it. Following Kirilov’s suicide after signing a 
confession claiming the responsibility, Véronique attempts to assassinate the Soviet Minister of 
Culture who is visiting France, but mistakenly shoots a different person. 
As an actor, Guillaume goes on to explore socialist theater, to work as apprentice, and to 
disseminate copies of the Little Red Book. Eventually, the landlords come back and are displeased 
by the chaos in the apartment. In the final scene, Véronique closes the door and, in the voiceover, 
says that this is merely the first step in a long march. 
 
Ideology 
The main characters in this film share the identity of Marxist-Leninist. Except for Henri, 
who identifies with communists and does sell Garde Rouge (14:25) but is nevertheless ousted for 
being “revisionist,” this group of people have ideas that are very much indeed consistent with the 
radical left-wing doctrines that Maoists promote, while vehemently opposing the Soviets mostly 
for their compromise to “the imperialists.” While often quoting Mao as their theoretical basis, they, 
however, do not zealously revere Mao personally judging from their expressions.30 In this sense, 
they are a fairly decentralized group, as they show no loyalty for any established political entity in 
France — albeit they are attempting to form one themselves. They do show support for the 
 
29 Francis Jeanson (1922-2009), a philosopher, journalist, and activist, was deeply involved in the FLN (the 
National Liberation Front) in the Algerian War. Used to work closely with intellectuals including Sartre, he also taught 
Wiazemsky in university, according to Colin MacCabe’s Godard: A Portrait of the Artist at Seventy 
30 The characters only mention “Mao” twice. Guillaume says that “Mao’s ideas can help me” (08:17), and 
Véronique refers to “the Chinese who apply Mao’s ideas” (34:23). 
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Communist regime of China, often accompanied with anti-imperialist critique on the US and its 
likes. All of them, including Henri, share deep dissatisfaction with the political and economic 
status quo — inequality, above all — of French society. 
There are not many conventional, norm-based emotion evokers attached to those 
characters. They are not portrayed as particularly altruistic nor selfish. They do express sympathy 
for people, but since the scope is limited to certain classes, it is not a “categorical” emotional 
evoker. In other words, it is qualified and depends very much on the audiences’ own constructed 
associations instead of the primal ones. Likewise, they are not very tolerant with internal dissents 
— a quality that could be considered either uncompromising by some or authoritarian by others. 
They also have a terroristic violent tendency — which might be accepted by some if they recognize 
the cause.  
This film is a particularly complicated case in terms of subjectivity. To begin with, we can 
hardly fit the text into one single cinematic genre. It has features of mockumentary, which is under 
the category of comedy, but if that were the case, it would have a too unusually serious tone as 
well as subject matter compared with its peers in this genre. In fact, the violence discussed and 
applied distinguishes the film from an ordinary political satire. Yet, the comical elements, 
including the comic strips used, parodic reenactment of various countries’ involvement in the 
Vietnam War, cartoonish human silhouette shooting target, the accompanied clips of pop song 
(“Mao Mao”), and the affectionate interactions, superpose a lighthearted mood that distinguishes 
the “story” from a typical tragedy. 
Also, the technique of meta-film adds an additional complexity. Apparently drawing ideas 
from Brecht’s theory of “distancing effect” (Verfremdungseffekt) — which was supposedly 
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inspired by Peking Opera, Godard deliberately includes the appearances of clapperboards, camera, 
personnel and the formality of documentary-style interview. 
 
 
Figure 4. The moments of distancing effect (La Chinoise, 9:02, 10:26) 
 51 
The original purpose of distancing effect is to prevent the viewer from being too 
emotionally immersed in the fiction, sympathizing with characters as presented, forgetting to 
intellectually judge the text on their own. On one hand, it does indeed partly cancel the 
subjectivity of authorship, or at least, it puts a reminder between the text and the viewer as a 
voluntary disclosure of the author’s inevitable and inherent subjectivity, as opposed to, in 
traditional practice, authors present their personal perspective, trying to convince the viewer of 
the author’s case while implying that they see the presented world on their own. On the other 
hand, however, this practice may lead to a false impression that the subjectivity solely exists in 
the displayed part. The fact is, the subjectivity is ubiquitous in cinematic piece or other forms of 
art — creative expression. Pointing to camera (and in the case of La Chinoise, with probably a 
different camera, see 9:02) as a disclaimer may be deceptive on a higher level when what it is 
filming is also staged, and even more so when it is supposed to invite independent thinking while 
virtually everything this thinking could possibly be based on is the text per se. 
In La Chinoise, it is even more complicated as it frequently takes the form of 
documentary-style interviews. The interviewees-actors interact with the filming personnel in 
character, which blurs the boundary of fiction and non-fiction, suggesting that the actors’ lines 
are not staged but rather they are the rebels named Guillaume, Véronique, etc., having an 
interview with a group of outsider31 documentary-makers.32 
 
31 Judging from Henri’s interview, in which the interviewer — supposedly with the filming crew — at that 
time does not even seem to know the name of Guillaume and other basic facts of the interviewees’ identity. 
32 The complexity (or inconsistency), however, is furthered by the ambiguous moment in which Henri seems 
to be acting according to a script (10:26).  
 52 
Another notable aspect is the use of illustrative images interweaved throughout the film. They 
are hardly neutral, and clearly represent the points that the characters make.  
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Figure 5. A flashed picture of Stalin, with eyes painted red, when Omar claims that his death enables freedom 
of speech, and a cartoon illustration as Véronique kills the wrong person, with sound of gunshots (La 
Chinoise, 18:59, 87:25) 
The extent to which these illustrations are “endorsed” by the author in this film is up to 
debate. They could be understood as purely illustrative, describing the sentiments of the characters. 
We may say this about the red-eyed Stalin (18:59, see Figure 5), and the reenactment of 
Americans’ killing of Vietnamese — accompanied by violent American comic superhero coming 
toward the camera (35:36, see Figure 5) as well as intense sounds of gunshots. However, even in 
this sense it still involves subjectivity of the author. And we also see such images used in the non-
interview part like the narration of Véronique’s assassination (87:25), in which case the violence 
is depicted in a lighter tone and creates an irony given the format of American comic strip, as well 
as an angle that puts the camera (viewer’ eyes) at that of the shooters’ perspective. Similarly, 
intertitles are used both to mark different sections of the film and to display ideological messages, 
most notably a quote from Mao (64:47, see Figure 6).  
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Two pieces of music also stand out in this film, one being an often-repeated excerpt from 
Vivaldi’s “Concerto for 2 Violins,” which is very upbeat, the other being “Mao Mao,” an upbeat 
pop song by Claude Channes that praises Mao’s ideas (e.g., anti-imperialism, mass line) — the 
exaggerative tone of the song, however, arguably cancels its seriousness as an otherwise 
undoubtable propagandist piece — very much an epitome of the whole film’s ideology. Besides, 
at the end of the film, Véronique’s voiceover also adds to a significant ambiguity of subjectivity. 
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Figure 6. The similar forms of intertitles that are used to functionally indicate a film sequence (“Dialogue 4: 
Henri after his exclusion from the Aden-Arabie Cell”) as well as display ideological remarks (“The 
imperialists are still alive […]”) (La Chinoise, 58) 
 Based on the various aspects, La Chinoise is a fairly “pure” piece in terms of ideology. 
Within the text per se, there is no provided epistemological benchmark that can be used to judge 
whether their ideas are incorrigibly absurd, or nobly idealistic, thus generating a set of particular 
sentiments. In fact, any of the cited basis of the characters’ sentiments, be that the cruelty of 
American military action in Vietnam, or the problem with PCF (the French Communist Party), 
comes from the same characters themselves, from whom the author of the film keeps an ambiguous 
distance. The film makes minimum universal association, refraining from suggesting the inherent 
favorability or unfavourability of this set of ideology to most audience, hence judgments are more 
of a reflection of the audience’s own associations. To put it in plain words, the message of the film 
is perhaps, “this is some of the self-claimed Maoists and their beliefs.”  
The complexity and ambiguity of the film defy a summary. 
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4.3 Weekend (“Week-end,” 1967) 
Context 
In the same year (1967), Godard made two more feature films, one of which being 
Weekend. This French-Italian co-production was said to be inspired by the idea of Julio Cortázar’s 
short story named “The Southern Thruway.” 
 
Plot 
The film is essentially a series of fragmented sequences, connected mostly by a storyline 
of an urban middle/upperclass couple’s road trip to the countryside. Both waiting for a right time 
to run away with each’s own secret lover, Roland (Jean Yanne) and Corinne (Mireille Darc) are 
unhappily married but still maintain the apparent relationship. They do, however, conspire to 
secure their inheritance of Corinne’s dying father’s wealth. On their way to Oinville, the village 
where Corinne’s parents live, they encounter prolonged traffic jams, bloody car accidents, a 
hijacker claiming to be Joseph Balsamo (Daniel Pommereulle), Emily Brontë (Blandine Jeanson), 
Saint-Just (Jean-Pierre Léaud), Tom Thumb (Yves Afonso), a pianist (Paul Gégauff), and anti-
imperialist revolutionaries. The couple kills Corinne’s mother after she refuses to split her 
husband’s legacy with them. In the end, Corinne joins a group of eccentric guerilla fighters who 
cannibalizes Roland. 
 
Ideology 
The ideology in the film is expressed as much scattered as the plot and the depiction of the 
characters are. One thing is, however, recurring and consistent, and that is the selfishness and 
dishonesty of this bourgeois couple. They have absolutely no concern of others’ feelings, and act 
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only for self-interests, without moral concern about the means they take. It is evident, for example, 
when they would kill for the inheritance. They are obsessed with material interests and superficial 
pleasure, a sign of consumerism — we can see this when they make wishes of luxury cars and hair 
color in front of Joseph Balsamo, crying for Hermès handbag as people are dying in a car accident 
(37:41), ripping clothes off the corpses (51:58). They are further associated with pro-U.S., pro-
Israel political opinions. At one time (64:59), when Roland asks for hitchhike, an old lady passing 
by asks him whether he would like to be “screwed” by Mao or Johnson. When he replies that, 
“Johnson, of course,” the lady asks the driver to drive on, and dismisses Roland as “Fascist.” Later, 
in another conversation (66:10), Corinne is asked whether Israel or Egypt struck first (in the Six-
Day War of 1967). When Corinne answers, “the bloody Egyptians,” the driver calls her “pathetic 
ignoramus” and leaves.  
There are other notable opinions expressed through various characters, who may not have 
much character arc but are nevertheless worth examination as they have real-life allusions. For 
example, when the couple set Emily Brontë on fire, Tom Thumb watches the flame and remarks: 
                        I said to myself: What’s the good of talking to them? If they buy knowledge, it’s  
only to resell it. They want knowledge to sell at a profit. They want nothing which  
would stand in the way of their victory. They don’t want to be oppressed, they  
want to oppress. They don’t want progress, they want to be first. They’ll submit to  
anyone who promises they can make laws. I wondered what I could say of them. I  
decided it was that. 
 
This is essentially a progressive intellectual’s disillusionment of the bourgeoisie.   
Similarly, there are lengthy manifesto-esque monologues by radical revolutionaries 
(69:12). In their remarks, they incite armed rebellion against the West’s imperialist oppression in 
Africa and the Middle East. They also make satirical critique on the U.S. foreign aid on Congo 
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(68:13), big oil companies’ practice in Algeria (68:57). With unsettling music, the camera cuts to, 
among clips of previous sequences, the indifferent, impatient look of the couple.  
Among others, the depiction of the so-called “FLSO” (Front de Libération de Seine-et-
Oise), perhaps a parody of many guerillas named “Liberation Front,” is filled with a pre-modern 
primitivity and violence (cannibalism, for instance). Roland also refers to Jesus as a communist 
(e.g., 29:28).  
The use of sound, which is often asynchronous, is as much anarchic as some sequences of 
images and appearance of intertitles. This feature, together with many self-referential lines (such 
as, at, 45:57, “What a rotten film! All we meet are crazy people”), does result in a distancing effect 
that, like in La Chinoise, breaks away from traditional cinematic narration. In some regards, it 
questions the very medium of film per se, which may be a sign of humble self-skepticism that 
could be counterproductively applied to the film’s own messages, or simply another radical 
message that calls for an end of pretense of objectivity in popular culture.  
 
 
Figure 7. The end; the end of the cinema (Weekend, 104:05) 
 59 
A gesture against tradition and authority, the final images of the film constitute a wordplay: 
“the end” (fin), “the end of cinema,” and the permission number for the film (104:05, see Figure 
7). It is a radical statement against different types of establishment. 
Lots of symbols in the film could be interpreted as satirical, exposing the general absurdity, 
fatigue, and disruption of modernity/capitalism. For example, in the lengthy depiction of a 
behemoth traffic jam, a Shell oil truck is stuck, so is a sailboat on a truck (see Figure 8). The 
recurring scenes of car crashes also attach disasters and dysfunctionality to modern life in general. 
 
 
Figure 8. A sailboat stuck in traffic jam (Weekend, 22:10) 
To summarize the ideology without definite categorization, we can conclude that the film 
delivers strong ideological messages on a subtly nuanced universal level. Although it contains 
multiple sentiment evokers — mostly negative ones — toward specific “imperialist” regimes such 
as the U.S., they merely scratch the surface on those specifics. Through fictional roles whose real-
life references are not emphasized, the film focuses on rather general sentiments on a class — 
without a qualification that specifies “French capitalists.” What makes it nuanced is that this one 
class is specific: the bourgeoisie. It is similar for its anti-imperialist message that targets Western 
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powers — not limited to a particular power but still very much specified. The film’s subjectivity 
is limited as it does not confine the viewer’s perspective to a very specific one — there is hardly 
someone embodying the author’s attitude. This film seeks to distance the viewer, in subtle manners 
and through its reference to the film’s artifact nature, which could be a way to be deliberately 
inconsistent, or a medium-shattering blunt radicality of its messages.  
 
4.4 Tout va bien (1972) 
Context 
In the 1972 film, Tout va bien (“All’s Well” / “Just Great”), “Mai 68” is frequently 
referenced in past tense. In the middle of his “revolutionary” period, Godard once again 
collaborated with the radical filmmaker Jean-Pierre Gorin. With him, Godard cofounded the Dziga 
Vertov Group after their previous film Le Vent d'est (“Wind from the East,” 1970). 
By that time, major changes happened in French politics. Premier Pompidou effectively 
brought workers’ strikes to an end with the Grenelle Agreement (May 27), a result of strategic 
negotiations with labor unions and employers. In June 1968, de Gaulle's party had a major victory 
in the legislative election. A year later, however, in a referendum on a constitutional amendment 
much regarded as de Gaulle’s pursuit for a personal mandate, the majority voted against his 
proposal, leading to the president’s subsequent resignation. Pompidou, previously dismissed by de 
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Gaulle from office, became his successor after all, continuing the Gaullist Party’s rule without de 
Gaulle.33 
The PCF (the French Communist Party) in May ’68 supported the workers’ strikes while 
denouncing the revolutionary students’ riots — many of the students were Trotskyists, Maoists, 
anarchists, and activists of the “New Social Movement,” which came into fashion after May ’68. 
The party’s relatively new alliance since mid-1960s with moderate leftwing parties had only 
lackluster results by far in the early 1970s. 34 General Confederation of Labor, or the CGT, is a 
signatory in the Grenelle Agreement and, in 1970s, a supporter of the Union of the Left — of 
which the PCF was a member.  
Within the French Maoists, the most prominent faction is “Gauche prolétarienne” (GP),35 
a “Mao-Spontex”36 party, of which La Cause du peuple (“The People’s Cause”) was the press 
organ. Jean-Paul Sartre directed this paper for a period of time, before co-founding a center left 
daily, Libération, in 1973. 
The GP was founded by some former members from The Union of Communist Youth 
Marxist-Leninist (Union des jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes), or “UJC(ml),” which 
was banned by de Gaulle during May ’68. UCJ(ml) was founded by ousted members of Union of 
Communist Students (Union des étudiants communiste, “UEC”), a part of Young Communists 
 
33 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Georges Pompidou.” 
34 Encyclopædia Britannica, “French Communist Party.” 
35 According to the French journalist and actor, Christophe Bourseiller, cited in Julian Bourg’s From 
Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought. 
36 “Mao-Spontex” (Mao-spontaneity) is a version of Maoism that purportedly rejects authoritarianism, 
centralized organization, and (Soviet) “revisionism.”  
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Movement of France (Mouvement Jeunes Communistes de France, “MJCF,” a.k.a. “JC”). These 
organizations are all independent from the PCF. 
In February 1972, Pierre Overney, a Maoist protester and former worker at a Renault 
factory, was killed by a security guard. In June 1972, a high school student and UJC(ml) militant, 
Gilles Tautin, drowned while escaping from police.  
 
Plot 
The film begins with two voices in the background discussing the idea of making a film. 
With characters, including their relations, identities, backgrounds, being conceived, a story 
emerges: An American reporter, Suzanne (Jane Fonda), goes to a sausage factory in France to 
interview its manager (Vittorio Caprioli), only to find the manager locked up by workers on strike. 
She and her husband, commercial director Lui (Yves Montand), end up staying with the manager 
in his locked office. During the lockup, different parties voice their opinions on the situation. The 
manager dismisses the whole “class struggle” narrative, saying that Marxism has been a failure, 
and the capitalist system has brought general prosperity. A CGT shop steward, while 
acknowledging the industrial landscape’s growing impact on workers and supporting stoppage and 
negotiations, condemns this incident as a counterproductive act of irresponsible minority. Other 
workers, echoing the hardships in working conditions, dismiss the CGT’s stance and its criticism.  
Then in the later half, the film focuses on Lui’s and Suzanne’s reflections on their roles in, 
and after, May ’68. In light of his witness of workers’ continuing struggle, Lui shows regrets about 
his own pessimistic decision of shifting career from directing art films to directing commercials 
after May ’68. Suzanne expresses her frustration about her reports that have been rejected 
repeatedly by the broadcasting company. Their words are often accompanied by scenes from 
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May ’68, at their respective work. After the two’s silent meeting in a café are the views of desolate 
streets. Voiceover announces the film’s end. 
 
Ideology 
In the factory, there are essentially three camps of characters: the manager, the striking 
workers, and the CGT members. The manager, an upper/middle class for sure, is a stereotypical 
“capitalist” who rejects the idea of “class struggle,” and considers it outdated because “the glaring 
injustices of Marx’ and Engels’ days are over.” That is essentially a classical liberal view, as it 
considers injustice indeed existed but also deems it only a thing of the past. He defends the 
capitalist economic system, citing the prosperity it has brought (15:43), while granting inevitable 
but acceptable imperfections (16:27). He claims that “balance” is needed in dealing with the 
drawbacks (17:03) — a rather conservative rhetoric. Also, in vague reference, he points to USSR 
and its likes’ collectivism as a failure of Marxism since such a system, in his account, did not do 
away with alienation and exploitation. He rejects the idea of “revolution” (15:34) but is somewhat 
more open to the union’s approach (14:38).  
This stereotypical capitalist is said to be inhumane to workers, for example, setting extreme 
short work breaks (35:08). Besides, the manager is also depicted in a comic light. His exaggerated 
body language, his spying on the workers, and the plot of looking for toilet, all seem absurd but 
also may cause some “humanization” — making him more relatable.   
All workers depicted share discontents with their treatment. The CGT member holds a self-
claimed “rational” strategy but is against the striking workers’ approach. According to a striking 
worker, they claim to be against “Mao” (28:56). The striking workers, however, are not only 
against CGT but also sympathetic to Maoism (29:03). The difference they cite to distinguish 
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themselves from CGT includes that the latter considers the foremen necessary (51:08), and that 
CGT dismisses strikers’ more radical (physical) approach (the lockup). 
This couple, one a journalist and the other a director, both are depicted sympathetic to 
workers — striking ones in particular. But they sometimes seem pessimistic, and occasionally 
utterly defeatist. The point is, they question themselves about their incapability and inaction. In 
other words, they are “lost intellectuals” who ideological align with the workers.  
In terms of subjectivity, the film takes a subtle stance as it always leaves the couple and 
the striking workers to make their final case. The distancing effect or the attempt of that is 
manifested in the frame story of filmmaking, the moments of breaking the fourth wall, and the 
mise en scène of the factory. Those techniques indeed serve a reminder of the artificial nature of 
the text. Their function, however, is very much limited since the characters’ address to the viewer, 
despite breaking the fourth wall, are always in character. But still, it is a fair disclosure. 
To sum up without definite categorization, we can conclude that the film contains relatively 
strong and relatively universal political messages supporting working class and radical political 
measures. A humbled call for re-revolution, it is, above all, critical of capitalism. The lack of 
primal emotion evoker, however, makes the conclusion less certain. Also, these messages are 
delivered without an entirely unequivocal stance in terms of structural subjectivity, and it does 
attempt to distance the viewer to some extent and disclose its subjectivity. 
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Figure 9. Breaking the fourth wall without breaking character (72:10, 72:14, Tout va bien) 
4.5 The Mother and the Whore (“La Maman et la Putain,” 1973) 
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Context 
May ’68 is characterized by some as a “libidinal” revolution for a reason.37 The precursor of the 
unrest was Nanterre students’ discontent toward dormitory policy that forbade male and female 
students from sleeping together. Protests started in 1967 and continued in the next year. In 
January 1968, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a student leader, complained to the visiting Minister of 
Youth and Sports about the policy, only to be dismissed by the official, who suggested that 
students should calm down in a swimming pool. This student, whose rebellious act earned him a 
reputation ever since, in return called the response that of a “fascist regime.” This incident, 
followed by far-left students’ occupation of an administration building (Movement of 22 March), 
escalated the tension between the students and the authorities, and eventually led to the shutdown 
of Nanterre campus. Consequently, riots began to take place around Sorbonne, where the harsh 
response of the police brought the students more sympathizers.  
The “post-New Wave” director Jean Eustache’s The Mother and the Whore does not have an 
unprecedent subject matter. Truffaut’s previous piece, Jules and Jim (1962) also deals with an 
open romantic relationship. Nudity on screen by then was already nothing uncommon. 
 
Plot 
The film features the love life of an unemployed young man, Alexandre (Jean-Pierre 
Léaud), who lives with his lover, Marie (Bernadette Lafont), in an apartment in Paris. At first, 
Alexandre attempts to save his relationship with his ex-girlfriend, Gilberte (Isabelle Weingarten). 
 
37 Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of 
the 1960s 
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When turned down by Gilberte, who is marrying another man, Alexandre is attracted by a female 
stranger on street and asks for her phone number. Despite Marie’s jealousy, Alexandre begins to 
date this younger woman, Veronika, a nurse living in a hospital, and, in her own account, a 
libertine, happily unattached (she comments on how she likes her state at 54:02: “[v]ery much. I 
hope it lasts”). While Marie is out on an errand, in that apartment, Alexandre and Veronika begin 
to sleep together, which irritates Marie when she later finds out. However, Alexandre’s 
relationships with both lovers are not really affected. One morning, Veronika even joins the bed 
in the apartment with the other two. But this ménage à trois does not last long as Marie’s invitation 
of her another lover, Phillipe, angers Alexandre. Veronika attempts to bring the two together, but, 
under the influence of alcohol, ends up with her own emotional breakdown, recounting her 
previous loveless sexual experiences, slurring in tears that “no woman is a whore.” After a long 
silence, Alexandre drives Veronika back to her hospital dormitory, where he is pressed to promise 
Veronika that he will marry her.  
 
Ideology 
This film is not overtly political. The most obvious political messages are in Alexandre’s 
words. He is against obedience to authorities and enchantment of wealth, as he moans for women 
who swoon over the soldiers in uniforms, sports cars, and young businessmen (26:16). He is 
critical of class as a factor of confinement in romantic relationships (33:31). He also does not like 
the fact that people are forgetting too soon about the “crisis” when he satirically and somberly says 
to Gilberte, “[y]ou are rallying like France after May ’68, my love.” But he and his friend express 
a certain degree of contempt for Sartre, and dismiss his “Maoism” and his contribution to the 
Maoist newspaper, “The People’s Cause” (La Cause du peuple) as drunk talk.  
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The characters not only embody a “liberated” lifestyle but are very much self-aware and 
reflective about the social change. Veronika, for example, talks about her sexual experience and 
asks why women are not allowed to express sexual desire. Their discussion on the “Women’s 
Liberation Movement” also goes further and deeper than revolutionary slogans (starting from 
45:14): 
                         ALEXANDRE. You don’t know? “The Women’s Liberation Movement.”  
    Women tired of serving men breakfast in bed. They’ve rebelled. The have a  
    slogan: “No more men in our beds!” 
VERONIKA. That’s sad… 
ALEXANDRE. Yes, I think they’re very sad… 
VERONIKA. I like bringing a man I love breakfast in bed. 
ALEXANDRE. I have a friend who believes, that a woman’s function is to bring  
    him breakfast. I heard him say so to a raving women’s libber. I thought there’d    
    be a bloodbath. In fact, he seduced her, talking about his grandma, who spent  
    her life doing housework and raising children and grandchildren. Now, she  
    can’t live without him! 
 
This particular dialogue and the film’s extensive and usually explicit discussion on 
sexuality overall openly break away from cultural conservativism. However, Veronika’s 
monologue on her torment in her libertine lifestyle and Alexandre’s eventual “surrender” to 
traditional commitment with Veronika add more complexity to the film’s message. In this regard, 
it is best to be interpreted as a “post-sexual-revolution” struggle, where the return to pre-revolution 
“norm” is not a truly desired outcome, but for the lack of a feasible alternative. It is by no means 
a pro-conservative lecture. But rather than a call for liberation, it appears to be more of a 
postmodern tragedy.  
There are not many clear primal emotion evoker attached to the characters in the film, 
however. Structurally, the story is also not told from one character’s perspective. There is no 
attempt to distance the audience whatsoever. 
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To sum up without definite categorization, we can conclude that this film delivers some 
ideologically weak messages on a relatively universal level, promoting positive sentiments about 
social liberty, abandoning cultural conservativism, while doubting the feasibility of such a 
liberation and reflecting on its desirability.  
4.6 Chinese in Paris (“Les Chinois à Paris,” 1974) 
Context 
Not all films that refer to the political affairs in that decade are arthouse pieces. The 
political comedy Chinese in Paris (1973) is, for one, by no means a serious cinematic work deemed 
by academia and critics. The director Jean Yanne was the actor who starred the bourgeois 
protagonist in Godard’s Weekend (1967).  
 
Plot 
The Liberation Army of Communist China, after conquering vast lands in Europe, finally 
invades France. The French president (Bernard Blier), after delivering a resistance speech, quickly 
flees to America. People are left panicking; many are killed when fighting against each other on 
their escaping route on the highway. But a businessman, Grégoire Montclair, is preoccupied with 
an affair with his lover, Stéphanie (Nicole Calfan), as the Chinese military occupies Paris.  
Welcomed by the French police, the church, and the press, the Chinese military, headed by 
Pu Yen (Kyōzō Nagatsuka), settles at Galeries Lafayette as headquarters, picks a governor, Mr. 
Montaubert (Jacques François), and begins to implement revolutionary policies: They order that 
every European nation only make one type of product, so that France can only make their specialty 
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— pipes; They confiscate private automobiles so that people will no longer suffer their 
“suppression;” They encourage people to denounce each other’s bad behaviors such as fornication. 
While many complain about the Chinese occupants’ policies, Régis Forneret (Jean Yanne), 
a former adult shop owner, seeks to profit from the situation. He succeeds in running a theater that 
performs revolutionary opera, Carmeng, and then, after some French terrorist attacks on the 
Chinese occupants, suggests the reopening of brothels, strip clubs, and so on, in order to make a 
case of France as a bad example of incorrigibly degenerate country. Pu Yen, who is in great 
remorse for his recent fornication with Stéphanie, accepts his advice, and even orders his troops to 
join such activities as the city quickly sinks back to decadence. Angered by the Chinese betrayal 
of revolutionary ideals and the state of France, some radicals — including the newly “re-educated” 
Albert (Daniel Prévost) and Montclair, decide to turn their muzzle to the Chinese, only to find that 
they have already left.   
Things are returning to normal. As the president comes back from exile, Régis’ clients 
extend to the French government. In the end, he travels with Stéphanie to a Chinese-occupied 
Rome, where the Pope, with Chinese soldiers on his side, greets people from a window.  
 
Ideology 
In this fictional satire, no character is not depicted without ridicule. The French government 
is headed by a cowardly and pretentious president whose primary concern is his own life, with the 
second being his public image. The French military is incompetent, as they fail to even find the 
nuclear button. The press, the church, and the bureaucracy are all unprincipled fence-sitters, 
fawning over whoever holds the power. The Chinese occupants are portrayed to be obsessed with 
rather absurd policies on collectivism (e.g., passing on things collectively — see Figure 10), anti-
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modernism (considering cars of “suppression,” and hailing rickshaws with semaphores), 
production (one country, one product), and denunciation (notably The Televised Pillory, see 
Figure 10). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The “collectivism” and The Televised Pillory (14:36, 46:32, Chinese in Paris) 
The music is always lighthearted, the cinematography cartoonish. The subjectivity is not 
structurally obvious, but never does it remind the viewer of the film’s nature as an artifact. The 
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satire is on every front and no one is honored. In the film, capitalism has consumed people who 
are obsessed with consumer goods such as cars — simply tools of transportation, while the 
“communist” alternative of going backward is depicted just as ridiculous. The economic and 
political establishment is a fragile system based on self-serving motives and deceptive means, but 
nor is the ordinary people — those who wait in line, not knowing what for, just because others do, 
for instance — any more rational or moral. The withdrawal of the Chinese — or the 
“(de-)liberation” of France, is simultaneously a failed opportunity to evolve from an undesirable 
status quo, a manifestation of the undesirability of the “revolutionary” ideal, and a pathetically 
welcomed triumph of the old order.  
The only ideology that the whole farce promotes is anti-ideology. It is to some extent more 
of a nihilist postmodern depthless entertainment than a serious intellectual discussion or a 
propaganda that preaches a specific narrative.   
4.7 Summary 
Judging from the analyzed French films, not all of them are overtly political, and those who 
are do not always convey the same political messages. But there are a few features that are shared 
among them. First, they rarely deliver exclusive messages. Only La Chinoise directly refers to 
political leaders of France at that time more than once. The emotion evokers are often attached to 
the whole class in an abstract way — if we understand the depiction of certain people as a 
representation of their class identity. Second, the strength of ideology varies. In some films, the 
sentiments are very consistent, while in others, messages can be self-contradictory and even 
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involve self-negation — such as the return to the traditional norm of marriage in The Mother and 
the Whore. 
In terms of content of the ideologies, all of the films share a discontent toward status quo 
— especially political authoritarianism, cultural conservativism, and capitalism. Hardly can we 
read a truly conservative message in those films. At best, some are pessimistic to the prospects of 
social progress. Some, like Chinese in Paris, may appear to be more nihilist, with critique all over 
the ideological spectrum but nothing to advocate for.    
Radicals like Godard, with a salient self-consciousness, may deliberately attempt to 
distance the viewer from the cinematic text. Those who do appear to remind the audience of their 
subjectivity, however, may risk a hyper-deception since the distancing effects are not done to 
extremity — rarely, with possible exceptions such as Weekend, do the actors break the character 
or unambiguously refer to the film per se. Structurally, none of those films narrate from a singular 
perspective according to one supposedly “author-endorsed” character. 
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5.0 Concluding Remarks 
Judging from the analyzed texts, the Chinese films in Cultural Revolution may deserve the 
label of “hard propaganda:” They all have very explicit subjective stance with extensive primal 
emotion evokers as well as other emotion evokers. They all deliver stronger ideological messages 
with any possibility of inconsistency evaded, and do so on mostly the exclusive level, emphasizing 
sentiments on particular people, organizations, regimes, and policies, although they are also poised 
to be universal in some cases. These seemingly universal messages are radical egalitarianism with 
a not just sympathy for but also an approval (or even glorification) of the underprivileged many; 
the exclusive one evokes positive sentiments to the exceptional leader (Mao), the Party (when 
endorsed by Mao), and the regime; negative sentiments range from the imperialist foreign 
invaders, the Kuomintang, the exploiting class, to the revisionist comrades. All the characteristics 
are consistently shared among their peer texts. 
Their French counterparts are different in that they, judging from the studied cases, tend to 
be ideologically weaker — that is, less consistent — in the messages they deliver. Primal emotion 
evokers are rare. Some of the films, notably by applying the Brechtian techniques, reduce or 
attempts to sincerely disclose their subjectivity by actively distancing the filmed scenes from the 
audience. The messages they deliver are between universality and exclusivity in the sense that, 
they on the one hand have real-life references to which emotion evokers are attached, and the 
references are either more abstract or broader than what we see in “hard propaganda.” Despite 
relatively more inconsistency among the texts, the shared messages in them are anti-
authoritarianism and anti-capitalism.  
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The harsh critique of conventional political, economic, and cultural orders in the Chinese 
films, with notable exception of issues that later became the core demand of New Social Movement 
in post-68 France, are to different extents shared in those French films. But the unquestioned 
authority of one leader, Mao the ironically ultimate establishment in this anti-establishment 
Cultural Revolution, is not well translated to the French films. Mao’s ideas are occasionally 
referred to but much less so is his specific political leadership. In the French films, there is no such 
an actual counterpart — a central figure that is looked to.  
All films raise questions about the society in their own ways. But only Chinese films 
provide answers — or, more precisely, an answer, the answer. They have everything figured out 
for the audience, whereas the French films only end in aporia; or in other words, confusion, self-
reflection, and impasse. 
Beyond possible disagreements over my stipulated definitions of key concepts in the 
theoretical and methodological part, there are also the following caveats in my study: 
First, all those judgments made about the zeitgeist that are supposedly informed by these 
films are limited in their validity, since only a few works are selected in this study. The qualitative 
method that the study adopts has its limitation when any attempt of generalization is to be made. 
What can be made of the texts for sure — if they were ever certain — are only so for those texts 
themselves rather than their peers — peers of filmmakers, genres, countries, or time periods. 
Again, it should be stressed that the term “May 68 cinema” as used in the title should not be 
understood in a narrow sense, otherwise it would not be an accurate sample, since many are films 
in this study are made a few years after the relatively ephemeral events of that month in 1968.  
Second, the judgments on specific emotion evokers are inevitably based on assumptions 
that may not be perfectly valid. The emotion evokers’ effects may vary depending on interpretive 
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subjectivity, which for my purposes is based on the target audiences’ subjectivity in their historical 
context. Hence, it is possible that I have misread the context and therefore made wrong inferences 
about what emotions are conveyed in some cases. It is also possible that a film is not made to target 
the mainstream subjectivity of its context at all. In the latter case, it is conceivable, for instance, 
that a hypothetical film is made in the context of Nazi reign but by a German dissident filmmaker 
whose portrayal of Nazi officials seems to be propaganda for those who read it as a regime 
propaganda film but appears to be an anti-regime propaganda for the filmmakers’ intended fellow 
dissident audiences. Although this extreme case is probably only limited to films made without 
primal emotion evokers (unless the film is made within the context in which the filmmaker-
audience community defies even primal emotion evokers). The general problem here can be 
considered as a case of hermeneutic circle in which the determination of textual meaning depends 
on the interpretation of context, and vice versa, without a definitive, non-inferential criterion that 
derives unmistakable meaning.  
Third, the study, for its purposes, is largely based on an assumption that the depiction of 
people of a certain label is a depiction of this label per se and others to which the label is applied 
to. That is, depicting a good communist, for example, is presumed to be presenting a positive image 
to all communists. Whether this assumption is correct or not in every text, and the extent to which 
this assumption may hold true, are up to further debates.  
 Finally, on a higher level, my analytic method focuses almost exclusively on political 
messaging done through association between certain emotion-evoking things (or people) and 
certain (other) people. While I think this makes most sense in propaganda and fictional texts, and 
“association” is also quite broad, I do wonder whether this approach would make any rational 
discourse impossible: a tightly argued, well-written, and “fact-based” thesis, appealing to logos, 
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would not be distinguished from propaganda, and “reason” is, after all, rhetoric. Further studies 
may certainly critique — or defend — such reductive implications, if they indeed are implied in 
my treatment of the texts. 
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